342 The Political Economy of Trading States
as important. Furthermore, we have argued that these effects are interactive, the
effects of some of these variables depending on the levels of others. The Stolper-
Samuelson model really requires that collective action costs be low for Rogowski’s
broad trade policy coalitions to emerge: if there are collective action problems
and factors are perfectly mobile, trade policy coalitions will not necessarily form
along class lines and in fact may not form at all, due to familiar collective action
problems. The Ricardo-Viner model, in contrast, is much more amenable to the
incorporation of varying degrees of collective action costs. We made a related
argument regarding domestic political institutions, suggesting that the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem is more consistent with a majoritarian mode of policy making,
while the Ricardo-Viner model is more consistent with a non-majoritarian or interest
group politics model. In all these ways the paper raises broader issues about the
interplay of politics and economics, while laying out a calculus of preferences,
effects and likely actions and outcome which anyone contemplating the domestic
effects of trade needs to consider....
NOTES
- Pareto (1927), p. 379.
- Schattschneider (1935), pp. 127–128.
REFERENCES
Pareto, Vilfredo. 1927. Manual of Political Economy. New York: A.M.Kelley.
Schattschnieder, E.E. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall.