Charles P.Kindleberger 85disproportionate share of overhead costs of the collective good saddled on the
party that most wanted it.
Despite adjustments made in Prussian customs duties between 1819 and 1833,
the tariff remained low by British standards. Junker grain growers were hopeful
of importing British manufactures in order to sell Britain more grain. Junker
bureaucrats, brought up on Adam Smith and free trade by instinct, were fearful
that highly protective rates would reduce the revenue yield.
Outside of Prussia plus Hamburg and Frankfurt and the other grain-growing
states of Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and so on, there was interest in higher tariffs,
but apart from the Rhineland, little in the way of organized interests. Von Delbrück
comments that Prussia and Pomerania had free trade interests and shipping
interests, but that outside the Rhineland, which had organized Chambers of
Commerce under the French occupation, there were few bureaucrats, or organs
with views on questions of trade and industry. Nor did the Prussian government
see a need to develop them.
Saxony was sufficiently protected by its interior location so as not to feel
threatened by low tariffs, which, as mentioned, were not really low on coarse
cloths. On joining the Zollverein, Baden was concerned over raising its tariff, and
worried lest it be cut off from its traditional trading areas of Switzerland and
Alsace. It fought with the Zollverein authorities over exemptions for imported
capital equipment, but gradually evolved into a source of pressure, with Bavaria
and Wurtemberg, for higher tariffs on cotton yarns and iron. Fischer points out
the request for lifting the duty on cotton yarns from two talers per centner to five
was resisted by the weavers of Prussia (the Rhineland) and Silesia.
Cotton yarns and iron were the critical items. Shortly after the formation of
the Zollverein, a trend toward protection was seen to be under way. The Leipsig
consul reported a new duty on iron to the Board of Trade in February 1837 and
observed that the switch from imports of cotton cloth to imports of yarn pointed
in the direction of ultimate exclusion of both. Bowring’s letter of August 1839
noted that the manufacturing interest was growing stronger, that the existing position
was untenable, and that tariffs would be raised under the growing demands and
increasing power of the manufacturing states, or would be lowered by an alliance
between the agricultural and commercial interests.
Open agitation for protection began two and one-half years after the formation
of the Zollverein when the South pushed for duties on cotton yarns. Linen yarns
and cloth went on the agenda in 1839 and iron, protection for which was sought
by Silesian and west German ironwork owners, beginning in 1842. But these
groups lacked decisive power. The Prussian landed nobility covered their position
by citing the interests of the consumers, and Prince Smith, the expatriate leader
of the doctrinaire free traders, in turn tried to identify free trade and low tariffs
with the international free-trade movement rather than with the export interests of
the Junkers. The tariff on iron was raised in 1844, those on cotton yarns and linen
yarns in 1846. Von Delbrück presents in detail the background of the latter increases,
starting with the bureaucratic investigations into linen, cotton, wool, and soda,
with their negative recommendations; continuing through the negotiations, in which
Prussia was ranged against any increase and all the others in favor; and concluding