The Keeper of the Keys 31in the dispute. After collecting a security from both sides to ensure
that all parties would abide by his arbitration—which was, technically,
unenforceable—the Hakam would make an authoritative legal decla-
ration: “A pregnant camel is worth two camels.” As the Hakam’s arbi-
trations accumulated over time, they became the foundation of a
normative legal tradition, or Sunna, that served as the tribe’s legal
code. In other words, never again was arbitration needed to decide the
worth of a pregnant camel.
However, because each tribe had its own Hakams and its own
Sunna, the laws and traditions of one tribe did not necessarily apply to
another. It was often the case that an individual had no legal protec-
tion, no rights, and no social identity whatsoever outside his own
tribe. How the pre-Islamic Arabs were able to maintain intertribal
order when there was technically nothing morally wrong with stealing
from, injuring, or killing someone outside one’s own tribe is a compli-
cated matter. The tribes maintained relationships with one another
through a complex network of alliances and affiliations. But the easy
answer is that if someone from one tribe harmed a member of
another, the injured tribe, if strong enough, could demand retribu-
tion. Consequently, it was the Shaykh’s responsibility to ensure that
neighboring tribes understood that any act of aggression against his
people would be equally avenged. If he could not provide this service,
he would no longer be Shaykh.
The problem in Mecca was that the concentration of wealth in the
hands of a few ruling families had not only altered the social and eco-
nomic landscape of the city, it had effectively destroyed the tribal
ethic. The sudden tide of personal wealth in Mecca had swept away
tribal ideals of social egalitarianism. No longer was there any concern
for the poor and marginalized; no longer was the tribe only as strong
as its weakest members. The Shaykhs of Quraysh had become far
more interested in maintaining the apparatus of trade than in caring
for the dispossessed. How could the Law of Retribution function
properly when one party in a dispute was so wealthy and so powerful
as to be virtually untouchable? How could intertribal relations be
maintained when the Quraysh’s ever-expanding authority placed
them essentially beyond reproach? It certainly didn’t help matters that
as Keepers of the Keys, the Quraysh’s authority in Mecca was not just