democracy’ was an oxymoron; for us it may be a necessity as well as
an improvement on the model of direct plebiscitary decision-
making. But then, we may not be true democrats either. If we are
not, if we recognize an imperative to draw in the horns of the
enthusiastic democrat, this may be because we acknowledge the
dangers of majority tyranny. Majority tyranny is as serious a prob-
lem as we are likely to confront in our lives as politically engaged
citizens – and it is philosophically puzzling, too. We shall try to
fathom the complexities.
Finally we discuss the claims of deliberative democracy to be the
only ethically permissible method of settling deep moral dis-
agreements. We shall conclude that these claims, in reaching for an
ideal consensus, are overblown. There are good reasons for believ-
ing that substantial agreement concerning the issues put forward
for political settlement may be unreachable. Moral pluralism fos-
ters intractable debate. Differences in deep moral values, often the
product of divergent religious beliefs, seem irresolvable. Agree-
ment on a method of establishing policy, on reaching political
accommodation, is often the best we can hope for. Sadly, we have
no reason to believe that this best is good enough for the zealots of
dangerous causes. The democrat will have to use coercion to
defend his use of the ballot box.
INTRODUCTION