- 27-
On the withdrawal of Ben-hadad the hostility of Israel would, as experience had
shown, once more break forth under Ahab, or some new military leader, and threaten
Syria with the same or even graver danger than before. But if the spirit of the leaders
could be crushed by having their substance taken from them, then the chiefs of the
people would not only be detached from their native monarchy, which had proved
powerless to protect them, but in future rendered dependent on Syria, and hence led
to seek the favor of Ben-hadad, instead of giving their allegiance to their own
Israelitish rulers.
But the scheme was foiled by the clumsy frankness of its avowal. Ahab summoned to
his council the elders of Israel. He told them how on the previous day he had
expressed to Ben-hadad his willingness to make absolute personal submission and
surrender of all that he possessed - as Josephus, no doubt, correctly puts into his
mouth - for the sake of their preservation and peace. But the new terms which Ben-
hadad proposed involved the leaders of the people as well as himself, and meant ruin
equally to them all. In these circumstances, "the elders" counselled the absolute
rejection of the terms demanded. Their advice was ratified by a popular assembly
(ver. 8). These measures of Ahab were wise. Besides, the bearing of Ben-hadad must
have indicated even to a ruler less astute than Ahab, the weakness and folly of his
opponent. And, instead of attacking the city, on the refusal of his terms, as he would
have done had he been sure of his army, Ben-hadad now only sent a message of
ridiculously boastful threatening,^41 to which Ahab replied with calm dignity (vv. 10,
11).
Thus, for a time at least, Ahab seems in the school of adversity to have learned some
of the lessons which his contact with Elijah might have taught him. Besides, it is only
reasonable to suppose that both the composition of the force outside the city, and the
utter demoralization of its leaders, were known in Samaria. A summer campaign in
Palestine would have tried even the best disciplined troops. But the Syrian host
contained a motley following of thirty-two Eastern chiefs, who probably had little
other interest in the campaign than the hope of plunder. It was an army incoherent in
its composition, and unwieldy from its very numbers. Hitherto their advance had
been unchecked, and its progress, no doubt, marked by the desolation of the country
along their straggling line of march. Their easy success would make them not only
more reckless, but also unwilling to engage in serious fighting, especially in those
hot and enervating days, when their leaders lay in the cool shadow of their booths,
indulging in drunken orgies. It was a dissipated rabble, rather than an army.
Ben-hadad and his allies were engaged in a midday bout when the reply of Ahab to
the Syrian challenge arrived. Received under such circumstances, we scarcely
wonder that it provoked the order of Ben-hadad to make immediate preparation for
(^)