The internal colonialism thesis would seem to fit some cases of seces-
sion, such as Bangladesh which, as East Pakistan, was economically
exploited and politically marginalized by West Pakistan. The West wing
began with an initial economic advantage in receiving most of the entrepre-
neurs who migrated at independence and who were central to the West’s
industrial development. Then the new nation’s capital was established in
the West, further encouraging industrial and infrastructural development.
Development funds, foreign aid, economic and fiscal policies, foreign
exchange controls and licensing powers were used disproportionately to the
benefit of West Pakistan. The positive discrimination that would have been
necessary for the East to catch up was not forthcoming, further encouraging
the flow of resources to the more developed region.
But the main factor that led to a feeling of exploitation and discrimination
among the Bengalis of East Pakistan was the diversion of the East’s foreign
exchange earnings to the West. The differential between the two ‘wings’ of
the country in terms of per capita income, the relative contribution of agri-
culture and industry to regional incomes, school and university enrolments,
and the infrastructure generally and transportation in particular, increased
throughout Pakistan’s post-independence history (Jahan, 1973, pp. 30–2).
Political developments during this period confirm the broad outline of the
‘internal colonialism’ model. In the years immediately following independ-
ence Bengali representation in the national power élite was limited. Because
over half the population of Pakistan lived in the East, the Bengalis had
nearly 50 per cent representation in the political institutions which were
based on democratic recruitment. But only 5 per cent of the military élite,
30 per cent of the senior bureaucracy and 10 per cent of the entrepreneurial
class were Bengali. This became particularly significant with the abolition
of representative government after the military coupin 1958, and the con-
sequent dominance of the bureaucratic–military oligarchy. Bengali repre-
sentation in the political élite declined and their sense of alienation
increased. Following the government’s refusal to accept the results of the
1965 and 1971 elections, the Bengali élite concentrated its efforts on radical
autonomist demands (Rahman, 1976). Provincial autonomy was reduced in
a way which was more to the disadvantage of the East than the West.
Administrative and political centralization gave rise to demands for Bengali
autonomy which were fuelled by the central government’s economic poli-
cies (Jahan, 1973, pp. 23–30).
The case of Bangladesh, though unique, suggests some conclusions
regarding nationalism and secession that may have wider applicability in
the Third World. Though Bengalis had long been conscious of their cultural
Nationalism and Secession 205