Thus it may be theorized that if a region combines ‘ethnic potential’ with
an improved economic position (or a faltering core economy) it may become
politically assertive (Gourevitch, 1979; Wood, J. R., 1981). Part of the ‘fal-
tering core’ may be a failure to develop effective political bargaining, notably
through national political parties. The development of powerful regional par-
ties in Nigeria and Pakistan is felt to have increased secessionist instability
by focusing political conflict on regional rivalries (Wood, J. R., 1981).
Competition for economic and political power after independence became
increasingly regional in character. The regional orientation of political élites
intensified regional identities, conflict and the subordination of national class
differences to tribalism.
This still leaves a need for an explanation of nationalism in the context of
‘even’ development, such as the nationalism in East Africa, French Saharan
Africa and the West Indies which prevented workable federal amalgama-
tions between more or less evenly developed territories. There is also the
problem of why uneven development can exist without nationalist and
secessionist movements, though this may be a puzzle more for the devel-
oped than the developing regions of the world.
Little correlation has been found between minority separatism and polit-
ical or economic inequalities. Ecological stress, namely pressure on land or
other natural resources, has a stronger relationship to demands for separate
status by culturally distinct groups.
Horowitz drew an interesting distinction between regional and popula-
tion disparities to explain ethnic secession, and whether one or both are
‘backward’ or ‘advanced’. He points out that ‘backward groups’ (that is,
with below average educational attainments, per capita incomes and non-
agricultural employment opportunities) from ‘backward’ regions (that is,
with low regional incomes per capita) have attempted secession soon after
independence from a colonial power because of their inability to compete.
The southern Sudanese are an example, while the Hausa of northern Nigeria
might have been had it not been for their numerical size which endowed
them with political power. An advanced group in a backward region is only
likely to attempt secession as a last resort and as a result of discrimination
and violence. The Tamils in Sri Lanka are such a case. An advanced group
in an advanced region may attempt secession when it feels it is subsidizing
the rest of the country, unless there are economic and political advantages of
remaining part of the state (Horowitz, 1985). Such distinctions point to the
significance of internal social divisions within minority groups, and their
political and economic calculations, necessitating analysis it terms of élite
and class interests (see below).
Nationalism and Secession 207