of the circumstances under which a new, small state can be born and survive.
Yet the demand is clearly not constant, so the factors precipitating national-
ist mobilization have to be identified. Separation will appear a more rational
choice than integration, giving the minority the ‘maximum net advantage’
and worth the high risks involved, when specific conditions exist, such as
material inequalities, the exclusion of minority élites, the movement’s orga-
nizational capacities, and geopolitical support (Mitra, 1995).
Secondly, as explanation it pays insufficient attention to the organiza-
tional requirements of a successful bid for independence and the variable
political context in which it is made. The following organizational factors
affect a nationalist movement’s chances of political success: command of
community resources; identification with the community represented; an
ability to shape the identity of the group to be led; continuity in leadership;
and exclusive or dominant representation of ethnic demands. The intensity
and form of nationalist politics is also affected by contextual factors, espe-
cially the realignment of political and social forces (as when an organization
based on class proves more attractive to members of an ethnic group than a
nationalist body), the willingness of élites from dominant ethnic groups to
share political power, and the availability of alternative political arenas,
such as federalism (Brass, 1991, pp. 49–62).
Thirdly, it is important not to underestimate the ideological, governmental
and repressive apparatus which the state can bring to bear on separatist
movements. Impressive powers are available to central governments in deal-
ing with separatist regions, in addition to the more obvious and risky strate-
gies of military coercion and the withholding of public funds. Governments
have the ability to conduct a census which defines social categories for the
purpose of internal comparisons. They have the authority to define the
issues and conflicts that are to be politically managed, and an internation-
ally recognized right to negotiate with the separatists. They control taxation
(and therefore redistribution), define economic strata, collect information
and invest capital. Governments have the right to control internal migration
which can ‘alter drastically the ethnic composition of certain regions,
usually diluting the indigenous populations and thus undermining possibly
separatist tendencies’ (Enloe, 1976, p. 82).
Central governments can also call on diplomatic, administrative and
political resources, blocking external sponsorship of separatist dissidents
and exploiting divisions within regional communities. Sometimes they add
foreign interference to the list of reasons for not conceding independence,
as in the case of India’s handling of the Kashmir crisis.
Finally, it should not be assumed that the international context is wholly
supportive of aspirant nation-states, though the conditions identified by Birch
Nationalism and Secession 213