institutions. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the modernization theo-
rists’ perspective on change was determined as much by ideological leanings
as by rigorous scientific investigation. Tipps found modernization theory to be
heavily marked by ‘widespread complacency towards American society, and
the expansion of American political, military and economic interests through-
out the world’, and so constituted a form of cultural imperialism (1973,
pp. 207–10).
Functionalist approaches to political development also appear ethnocen-
tric, though purporting to be scientific, in that it is quite clear that a devel-
oped political system looks very much like Anglo-American pluralist
democracy. The end-state appears to be the system of government in the
country producing the major exponents of the theory (Holt and Turner,
1966, pp. 13–16; Galtung, 1971). There is nothing wrong per sein advocat-
ing a functionalist view of politics, such as the separation of powers, to
which Almond’s ‘output’ functions clearly correspond. The distinction
drawn by the functionalists between the ‘input’ side of the political equa-
tion, conceptualized in terms of socialization, recruitment, interest articula-
tion and aggregation, and communication; and the output functions of rule
making, application and adjudication, is important (Varma, 1980, p. 65). It
asserts the relationship between the mechanisms for public participation
and those for liberal government. The input functions imply mass participa-
tion on the basis of political equality in a modern society. However, such
advocacy is a far cry from a science of political change.
Change and causality
In biology the analysis of function is related to the analysis of causality. In soci-
ology and political science the move from description to causality was never
really achieved. So the claim of functionalism to be a theoryhas been seriously
questioned. It has been acknowledged as an elaborate description and classifi-
cation, able to describe the social practice which we find strange and difficult
to comprehend. But as explanation of causality functionalism suffers from the
fact that it is tautological – no explanation can be disproved because things are
defined in relation to themselves. A practice is said to persist because it con-
tributes to the maintenance of society. Its persistence is taken to prove that the
society is motivated to maintain itself. If the practice ceases this has to be taken
as indicative that it was no longer ‘functional’ to society’s maintenance.
Statements about the causes and consequences of social and political practices
are merely true by definition, not proved by explanation (Dowse, 1966).
Modernization and Political Development 69