Introduction to Law

two major kinds ofmens rea: intention and negligence. The English framework
includes a third subjective element in between intention and negligence, which is
called recklessness. Recklessness covers dangerous risk taking and bridges the gap
between the most serious and the lowest degree ofmens rea. As we will see below,
civil law systems bridge this gap by broadening the traditional concepts of intention
and negligence.

7.6.1 Intention

Intention (ordolusin Latin) is considered the most serious kind ofmens reain all
legal systems. Intention consists of knowing and wanting. Accordingly, the
elements of intention can be distinguished in a cognitive part, on one hand, and a
volitional part, on the other. Both elements are required, but depending on which of
those aspects dominates, we can distinguish two main forms of intention: direct
intent (dolus directus) and indirect intent (dolus indirectus).

Direct IntentThis form of intent is characterized by a strong volitional element,
where the consequence of an intention is actually desired. It is what we would
consider to be intentional conduct in an everyday meaning.

For example, John shoots at Mike with a firearm because he wants to kill Mike. Whether he

succeeds or not—John may happen to be a poor shooter, or the shot may not be lethal—

Johndesiresthe death of Mike and is therefore acting with direct intent. The focus is on the

will of the agent to bring about a certain result. And if Mike would as a matter of fact

survive his wounds, John would still be liable for an attempt to homicide (see for attempt

Sect.7.8).

Indirect Intent By contrast, indirect intent is characterized by a strong cognitive
aspect and exists where the agentknowshis conduct willalmost certainlybring
about the result, which he does not actually desire or primarily aim at.

For example, John burns down his villa in order to collect the insurance money for the

building, while knowing that his 90 year old grandmother is still upstairs sleeping in her

bedroom. John may not actually want the death of his grandmother—it is not his purpose to

kill her—but her death is nevertheless an almost certain side-effect of his actions. There-

fore, John directly intends the arson and indirectly intends to kill his grandmother.

Intent Is Not Motive It is essential to realize that intention is in itself value-neutral
and has nothing to do with motive. Intentionally, killing a person refers to exactly
that and not to killing because of an additional evil motive. Only in exceptional
cases, e.g. hate crimes, is the offense definition drafted in such a manner that intent
must relate also to a specific motive, e.g. racism, which confirms that the intent
itself is indeed neutral.

To illustrate the general rule, take the example of Mark who blows up his wife’s car to

collect the life insurance money. His direct intent is to kill his wife and his motive is purely

financial. This is however quite irrelevant to determine the requiredmens rea. He could

136 J. Keiler et al.