level, criminal attempts can be conceived as conduct carried out with the intent to
commit a crime but that fails to achieve the envisaged result.
The cardinal question for legal theory in the realm of attempt liability is how
close the offense must have come to completion in order for liability of the
perpetrator to be warranted. The problem with criminal attempts is that the conduct
giving rise to liability is often innocuous from an objective point of view. How can
we determine whether a person walking towards a barn carrying a newspaper under
his arm and a lighter in his pocket is an arsonist on his way to the scene of the crime
or an innocent civilian who likes to read his newspaper in front of the barn while
smoking a cigarette? It would seem that we can only draw a sensible line here by
focusing on the intentions of our suspect. Yet this raises other difficulties as
criminal liability for attempts would then seem to run the risk of introducing
what liberal penal systems abhor the most: the punishment of thoughts. After all,
to punish attempts is not so much punishing what an agent has done but rather what
he intends to do in the future. To avoid this pitfall, many criminal justice systems
have traditionally adopted a rather restrictive approach towards attempt liability.
Protected Legal Interest For one, attempts to commit a crime are often only
punishable where the underlying protected legal interest seems significant enough
to justify an expansion of criminal liability.
For instance, the penal codes or statutes of Germany, the Netherlands and England and
Wales generally confine attempt liability to serious (intentional) crimes, excluding attempt
liability for misdemeanors.
Border Between Mere Preparation and Criminal Attempt Likewise, courts
have traditionally devoted a large amount of case law to determine the precise
border between merely preparatory actions, which are generally not punishable, and
criminal attempts.
English Approach For example, in England, pursuant to Section 1 of the 1981
Criminal Attempts Act a person will incur liability if with intent to commit an
offence he commits an act which is “more than merely preparatory”.
The courts have traditionally interpreted the requirement of more than merely
preparatory actions narrowly. In R v Geddes the defendant was for instance found
waiting in a toilet of a boy’s school, equipped with a knife, lengths of ropes and
masking tape, strongly suggesting an intent to kidnap. However, as the man had not
yet approached a boy the court held that the defendant had not yet committed more
than merely preparatory actions and acquitted the defendant.
Dutch ApproachIn comparison Article 45 of the Dutch Criminal Code requires
that the perpetrator’s intentions have manifested themselves in the initiation of the
execution of the offence. In assessing this, the courts pay particular attention to
objective criteria and the question whether the outward manifestation of the
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