92 Kant: A Biography
to modify Leibniz's view, these modifications were not meant to be of a
fundamental nature. In fact, Kant claims that if he had more time, he
would show that his theory could do justice to Leibniz's "theory of univer¬
sal order and harmony," which has been made so "praiseworthy" by Leib¬
niz's view of living forces. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that he has
completed "some sketches" in which he is doing precisely that.^142 Kant
seems to say that he accepts the Leibnizian theory of preestablished har¬
mony. Indeed, his "new system" may be understood as giving a new foun¬
dation for this Leibnizian doctrine.^143 Yet Kant's preestablished harmony
is different from that of Leibniz in the sense that what is preestablished is
not just the internal states of substances, but both the internal states of sub¬
stances and their interactions. Furthermore, their interactions are of pri¬
mary importance for establishing a world. Still, Kant remains a Leibnizian
in one crucial respect: the order of the world is preestablished, and the
internal principles of the substances are in harmony with their external re¬
lations.^144 This means that he accepts a modified theory of preestablished
harmony as the correct systematic account of the world as a whole.
While Kant accepts physical influx as the correct account of certain kinds
of motions, he thinks that it cannot explain all of reality. It can only ac¬
count for external causality. The internal principles of substances obey dif¬
ferent laws. God (and his preestablished harmony) is required to keep the
internal and external forces in harmony. What consequences does this have
for our understanding of a passage that occurs very early in the book, and
that is often used to argue that Kant was an influxionist? In this passage,
Kant claims that "an acute author was kept from perfecting the triumph
of physical influx over preestablished harmony by nothing more than by
this slight confusion of concepts, from which one can easily extract one¬
self as soon as one pays attention to it."^145 This confusion concerns the
soul. In particular, it concerns the question of whether the soul, being an
immaterial being, can cause motion in matter. Kant argues that this ques¬
tion loses its paradoxical appearance as soon as we understand that the soul
can and must be said to have a "place" or "Ort." Claiming that the word
"place" means just the "mutual interaction of substances," he can argue
that any substance that interacts with other substances has a place. If the soul
has a place — and it does — then it can interact with other substances. This
means that the problem of how a soul can cause motion can be solved. Kant
also claims that it would be better to speak of force "in terms of effects in
other substances, which, however would not be further determined," and
not in terms of motion.^146