138 Kant: A Biographysensations of the good." He argued that "if the sensations of the good are
simple, the judgment, 'This is good,' is completely indemonstrable and a
direct effect of the consciousness of the feeling of pleasure associated with
the conception of the object." He also claimed that we do in fact possess
many simple sensations of the good, and that we must therefore admit
many unanalyzable conceptions of the good. They give rise, according to
Kant, to certain material principles of morality that are necessary condi¬
tions for any particular obligation. It is in "this respect Hutcheson and
others have provided a start toward some excellent observations."^183 Kant
must also have had in mind Hume's "pleasing sentiment of approbation,"
which is experienced by a disinterested spectator who has reasoned much
and made many nice distinctions. Kant's discussion of the material prin¬
ciples of morality derived thus largely from British sources.
These material, sense-based principles were insufficient for Kant, how¬
ever. He thought they stood in need of primary formal principles that are
the necessary condition for acting morally in general.^19 '* Kant said that
he was sure "after long consideration of this subject" what these primary
formal principles are. They are the basic principles of the Wolffian ethics
of perfection: "Do the most perfect thing that can be done by you," and
"Refrain from that whereby the greatest perfection possible through you
is hindered." Kant was unsure where these formal principles came from,
whether from sensation or from cognition. That is the fundamental prob¬
lem that he needed to solve before he could achieve "the highest degree of
philosophical evidence in the primary bases of morality."^185
At this point Kant seemed to think that while we know very little about
moral obligation, we can know a great deal about God. The principles of
natural theology have the highest philosophical evidence. Those of the
metaphysics of morals have not — or so Kant says. This is quite in keeping
with his Only Possible Argument, written around the same time. Kant closes
this book by saying that it "is absolutely necessary that one should con¬
vince oneself that God exists; that His existence should be demonstrated,
however, is not so necessary."^186 There is no reason to believe that Kant was
disingenuous in saying this. Though he was very much opposed to a cer¬
tain kind of theology, he did believe that there was a God. Furthermore, he
was convinced that he had offered the best — indeed, the only - proof. Later
he apparently lost faith in both his proof and God. As his friend in old age,
Pörschke, witnessed: "He often assured me that even when he had been
Magister for a long time, he did not doubt any dogma (Satz) of Christianity.
Little by little, one after the other, they broke off."^187
The Concept of Negative Magnitudes is another important product of