A Palingenesis and Its Consequences 177scientific truth, but he also accepted the rationalist view of the world that
is sometimes called necessitarianism. Kant was at least at first convinced that
"nature" was constituted by an ordered whole of necessary connections,
and that it was the philosopher's task to determine those things that could
not possibly be otherwise.
Adickes detected a shift toward a more empiricist position in the writ¬
ings of the early sixties, and he believed that this shift is visible in three
of Kant's claims. Contrary to his earlier position, Kant now held that:
(1) being is not a predicate or determination of any thing; it can, therefore,
not be proved by argument, but can only be experienced; (2) logical con¬
tradiction is entirely different from real opposition; and (3) the logical
ground {ratio or reason) of something is quite different from its real cause
{ratio or reason).^129 He believed that Kant's tendency towards empiricism
became stronger over time. While during the early sixties he was well on
the way toward empiricism, his writings of 1766 show that he had become
a full-fledged empiricist.^130 Nevertheless, it would be wrong, according to
Adickes, to call the Kant of this period a skeptic in the Humean fashion.
In fact, he argued that it would even be wrong to think that Kant was very
much influenced by Hume's way of philosophizing. The influence of Hume
came only later, that is, in 1769. Furthermore,
even during the time in which Kant came closest to empiricism, his ethical and reli¬
gious Weltanschauung did not change. Then as always, it formed the background and,
perhaps better, the basis for his thinking. The speculations of rational psychology and
theology were still as attractive to him as they were before. There was only one differ¬
ence: what earlier were scientific claims and demonstrations, are now private opinions
and subjective proofs. However, they are for this reason no less secure than the earlier
assertions.^131
This then is the picture that forms the background to most of the inter¬
pretations of the critical philosophy: Kant started out as a more or less or¬
thodox Wolffian; he then came under the influence of empiricism, but the
empiricist influence never went to the deepest core of his philosophical con¬
victions. This deepest core remained always essentially rationalistic.
Many scholars have attempted to refine Adicke's rough outline and have
introduced more periods and subdivisions into Kant's development, speak¬
ing of many different more or less radical "Umkippungen" "Kehren,'''' or
conversions on Kant's part.^132 While most scholars appear to have followed
Adickes's view of the period from 1755 to 1769 as a development away
from a fairly orthodox rationalism and toward some form of empiricism,
they have varied widely in their emphasis on who influenced Kant when,