182 Kant: A Biographyapproval of "a reasonable Pyrrhonism," whose basic principle says that we
must postpone a decisive judgment whenever the rules of prudence do not
require us to act in accordance with certain rules, whenever there are dis¬
tinct reasons to the contrary, and whenever it is not necessary to decide."^144
Metaphysics and ethics fulfill all three requirements of this basic principle,
and we may assume that Kant was well aware of this.
This Pyrrhonic maxim of the advisability of postponing judgment re¬
mained important for Kant, as is shown by notes that Herder took as a
student. There we find the following observations:
Pyrrho, really a man of great merit, founded a sect in order to go down another road,
to take down everything. Pyrrho: the universal dogmata (except those of mathematics)
are uncertain. His successors went farther. Socrates seems to have been somewhat of a
Pyrrhonist. The certain [principle] that makes happiness should be assumed. He was
a practical philosopher.^145
He also wrote down: "The Pyrrhonian '«o« HquetP is, as a wise oracular
saying, supposed to make difficult and hateful our empty brooding."^146
These passages show not only that Kant was acquainted with Pyrrhonism,
but also that he did not reject it outright. In fact, Pyrrho is explicitly called
"a man of merit." Comparing Pyrrho to Socrates, he considered Pyrrho's
principle of nonevidence as useful in keeping us from engaging in certain
kinds of useless intellectual activity. Furthermore, Kant identified the end
of the skeptic as a moral one. It is also significant that Hume played a large
role in these lecture notes, and that Kant's view of the role of philosophy
was entirely negative. Thus he argued, apparently thinking himself to be
in agreement with Hume, that philosophy "now has only the use of pre¬
venting us from doing anything that would be worse; and if it makes us
moral, then only indirectly."^147 Kant then valued Hume for the same rea¬
sons he valued Pyrrho. Both were for him important as examples of how to
employ the skeptical maxim that judgment in metaphysical matters should
be postponed.
How much Kant appreciated the skeptical method can also be seen from
his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, which is perhaps his most skeptical writing. In
it he observes that even though he might not have insight into the secrets
of nature, he is confident enough "not to fear any enemy, however terribly
equipped ... to make in this case the attempt of opposite reasons in refu¬
tation, which, among scholars really is the skill to prove to each other one's
ignorance."^148 Furthermore, he goes on to attempt to show that we cannot
possibly know anything of spirits or minds. The "mundus intelligibilis" or