Silent Years 199The discovery of the subjective character of the causal relation "not only
cuts off all hope of ever attaining satisfaction, but even prevents our very
wishes; since it appears that when we desire to know the ultimate and op¬
erating principle, as something, which resides in the external object, we
either contradict ourselves, or talk without meaning." Here the question
of the very possibility of metaphysics is asked in the context of a discus¬
sion of the causal principle, and this must have become immediately clear
to Kant - whether before or after reading Herz does not matter. Kant
agreed with Hume that the connection or tie between cause and effect was
a "determination of the mind." Though he found this determination in
pure reason and not in the imagination, his problem was the same as
Hume's: how can we go from "that in us which we call 'representation' to
the object?"
This did not exhaust Hume's problem, for in the Conclusion of Book I,
the problem of causality is placed in a wider context. It is not just that the
understanding forces us to "either contradict ourselves, or talk without a
meaning." Hume also found fault with his fundamental principle of imag¬
ination. It also leads "us into error when implicitly follow'd (as it must
be)." For this principle "makes us reason from causes and effects and
convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent
from the senses. But tho' these two operations be equally natural and nec¬
essary in the human mind, yet in some circumstance they are directly
contrary, nor is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly from causes
and effects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter.
How then shall we adjust these principles together?"^42 It leads to funda¬
mental and, if Hume is correct, inevitable contradictions. Clearly more work
was needed.
From Hamann's point of view there was, of course, more at stake. It was
his attempt at criticizing pure philosophy. The title of his translation cap¬
tured very well the existential despair of the Humean text that is so unchar¬
acteristic of Hume. To give just a few examples:
But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy which lie before
me, I find myself inclined to stop a moment in my present station, and to ponder that
voyage which I have undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and
industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. Methinks I am like a man, who, having
struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escaped shipwreck in passing a small frith,
has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even
carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvan¬
tageous circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities makes me diffident