264 Kant: A BiographyThis antiskeptical interpretation of Kant has - at least initially - a cer¬
tain amount of philosophical and exegetical appeal. Kant describes the gen¬
eral outlines of his critical project in different ways. For example, he says
that it is a "tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dis¬
miss all groundless pretensions ... in accordance with its own eternal and
unalterable laws" (Axi), or the solution of "the general problem: How is
knowledge from pure reason possible?"^58 As such, it also is for him an at¬
tempt to "decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in gen¬
eral" (Axii), and is meant to enable reason "to follow the secure path of a
science, instead of, as hitherto, groping at random, without circumspection
or self-criticism" (Bxxx). On the other hand, the Critique is also intended
to be "a happier solution" to "Hume's problem," or "the execution of
Hume's problem in its widest extent."^59 As Kant tells us, it was occasioned
by Hume's "suggestion" or "reminder" or "objection" concerning causal¬
ity, which "first interrupted [his] dogmatic slumber and gave [his] inves¬
tigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."^60
But we are also told by Kant that he "was far from following" Hume in his
"conclusions," for Hume "ran his ship ashore for safety's sake, landing on
scepticism," whereas he himself succeeded in establishing a new "for¬
mal science."^61 Indeed, Kant thought that his work finally "points out the
true mean between the dogmatism which Hume combats and the skepti¬
cism which he would substitute for it."^62 Given these pronouncements, it
may seem reasonable to say with W. H. Walsh that Kant had two projects,
or that he was preoccupied with "two major issues, that of the nature and
possibility of metaphysics, and that of the countering of scepticism." Kant
wanted to accomplish two different things. On the one hand, he intended
to show that there could be a descriptive sort of metaphysics, having to do
with the "necessary framework of experience," and, on the other hand, he
also "hoped to counter Hume."^63
Nonetheless, Kant's project was different from the one that Walker,
Walsh, Stroud, and Rorty attribute to him. Kant did not mean to refute a
global skepticism about all claims to objective knowledge. Rather, he saw
himself as responding to a local skepticism. This local skepticism con¬
cerned the possibility of claims to knowledge made in metaphysics, and
not the possibility of knowledge claims in general. He was concerned to
show that some of the particular claims metaphysicians are wont to make
are indeed possible or justifiable. Refuting a local skepticism concerning
the possibility of certain metaphysical claims is different from refuting a