266 Kant: A Biography
Kant's Prolegomena was meant to offer a sketch of this system according
to the "analytic method." It presupposes that science (as mathematics and
physics) is actual and works backward to first principles. The Critique starts
from more general first principles and follows the "synthetic method."^66
Neither of them contains the whole system. Kant continued to work on it
for the rest of his life. Indeed, while he was working on the Prolegomena and
settling into his new house, he was also working on the further develop¬
ment of his system, and in particular on its moral part. Finally, after almost
twenty-five years, he could concentrate on the Metaphysics of Morals that
had first motivated him to engage in the critical project.
One of the first public occasions for a closer investigation of moral mat¬
ters was a book by one Johann Heinrich Schulz (1739—1824), of which
Kant wrote a review. The book was entitled Attempt at a Guide toward a
Moral Doctrine for All Mankind Independent of Differences of Religion, to¬
gether with an Appendix on the Death Penalty.^61 Its first part had appeared
in 1783, and its author was a preacher in Gielsdorf who had become no¬
torious as an atheist or "preacher of atheism."^68 He was also called the
"Zopfprediger" or "ZopfSchulz" (Ponytail Schulz), because he refused to
wear the traditional wig that preachers had to wear and donned a ponytail
instead. Schulz argued in this book that there was no such thing as free
will, and that human behavior, just like the behavior of any other living be¬
ing, was completely determined. "As far as the will is concerned, all incli¬
nations and instincts are contained in just one [principle], namely love of
self. Though every human being has a particular mood {Stimmung) in this
respect, this mood can never depart from a general mood. Self-love is
always determined by all the sensations in their entirety, but in such a way
that either the more obscure or the more distinct sensations have a greater
part in this determination."^69 When only obscure sensations determine
self-love, we call the resulting action "unfree." Actions are called free when
they are the result of conscious representations, but this does not mean
that we are really free. It's all due to our mood, or the totality of our sen¬
sations at any one time. Therefore, the distinction between virtue and vice
is illusory, moral praise betrays a lack of sophistication, and punishment
is unjust.
Against this view, Kant pointed out that Schulz's theory had similarities
to that of Priestley; that Martin Ehlers, a professor in Kiel, had recently
argued for a similar position; and that it had become common among
British preachers. He could also have mentioned Frederick the Great, who
had said.