308 Kant: A Biography
Only if we continue to accept that prerogative of reason that "makes it the
greatest good on earth, namely its right to be the ultimate touchstone of
truth," only then are we worthy of freedom, and only then can we hope to
further the enlightenment not just of individuals but of an era. Mendels¬
sohn ultimately did not trust enough in reason. Jacobi denied reason alto¬
gether and opted for faith. In this, he was, as Kant clearly understood,
close to his friend Hamann and his former student Herder. Kant pleads
with them as "friends of the human race" not to give in to the temptation
of irrational fears and hopes and to continue to work against superstition
and zealotry, or for Enlightenment. His pleas fell on deaf ears - at least
with those who really counted. Mendelssohn, who might have listened, had
died before Kant even wrote the essay. Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, and those
who were close to them had not just given up hope in the promise of En¬
lightenment, but had long since embarked on a quest to seek new goals.
"Objectivity," a notion so important to Kant, was for them something to
be overcome. They were intent on substituting a poetic vision of nature for
mere scientific and moralistic reasoning. For Kant, this represented a loss
of nerve that could only have bad consequences.^145
The essay "What Is Orientation?" is closely related to Kant's "Some
Remarks on L. H. Jakob's Examination of the Mendeksohnian Morning
Hours," which appeared as a Preface to Jakob's book in 1786. Jakob ap¬
proached Kant in March of 1786, asking whether the rumor that Kant was
going to write something against Mendelssohn was correct. If it was not,
then he, Jakob, would like to undertake that task. Kant answered that the
rumor was false, and he encouraged Jakob to proceed, even promising him
to contribute to the project.^146 The Preface is the fulfillment of this prom¬
ise. Kant appears to have sent it to Jakob at about the same time that he
sent "What Is Orientation?" to Biester.^147 So he worked on both pieces
at the same time.
The Preface takes up the same concerns that Kant expressed in his "What
is Orientation." Mendelssohn's appeal to common sense throws into doubt
the very enterprise of a critique of pure reason. Kant criticizes two of
Mendelssohn's "maxims" in particular, namely his claim that all the dis¬
putes between philosophical sects are ultimately nothing but semantic
quibbles, and his repeated attempts to silence questions long before they
have been properly considered. Using the problem of freedom versus de¬
terminism as an example, Kant tries to show that Mendelssohn was wrong
in calling it merely a verbal dispute. It is an important issue, even if dog¬
matic metaphysicians cannot resolve it. To show how Mendelssohn closed