Kant: A Biography

Problems with Religion and Politics 349

In it, Kant states and claims to solve the antinomy between the thesis that

the judgment of taste is nonconceptual, for if it were, it would be open to

dispute, and the antithesis that the judgment of taste is conceptual, be¬

cause there is a diversity of judgment and consequently dispute.^71 Kant

assures us that "all contradiction disappears ... if I say: The judgment of

taste does depend on a concept (of a general ground of the subjective func¬

tionality of nature for the power of judgment), but this concept does not

allow us to cognize or prove anything about the object because it is inde¬

terminable in itself and unfit to be a cognition."^72 This shows again how

closely taste and morality are connected. Beauty is a symbol of morality.

Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral in¬

terest possible without too violent a leap. It does so by representing the imagination

even in its freedom as functional for determination of the understanding and by teach¬

ing that we can also find free delight even in objects of sense without sensual charm.^73

In the Critique of Teleological Judgment, Kant argues that mechanical
accounts of nature cannot make sense of organic form. They cannot ex¬
plain the origin even of a blade of grass. Nature seems to be designed.
Everything seems to have a function. To account for this, Kant formulates
a principle of reason to the effect that "Everything in nature is good for
something; nothing in it is in vain." While this is a subjective principle,
that is, a maxim, and merely regulative and not constitutive, it is never¬
theless "a clue to guide us in the study of natural things."^74 Therefore, it
is indeed a principle "inherent in science." Since it is just a maxim, it does
not need a deduction.
On the other hand, it does give rise to an antinomy, namely the conflict
between the claim that "All production in nature is possible on mere me¬
chanical law" and its contradiction, "Some production of such things is
not possible on mere mechanical laws."^75 Strictly speaking, however, we
cannot make either claim. We should restrict ourselves to the subjective
maxims that say: "All production in nature must be judged as being possible
on mere mechanical law" and "Some production of such things cannot be
judged as possible on mere mechanical laws." There is no contradiction be¬
tween these two maxims. In fact, each may have its place in science, and,
as long as we are careful to apply the second maxim sparingly, it does not
stand in the way of rigorous science.
The problem of teleology gives rise to the problem of design, and de¬
sign seems to lead almost naturally to theology. The emphasis must be on
"almost." Picking up on concerns that had surfaced in his dispute with