Problems with Religion and Politics 377to the Academy is not clear. What is clear is that he drafted a fairly exten¬
sive answer to the question, in which he tried to show that there was in¬
deed progress, namely, his own critical philosophy. Taking up a distinction
familiar from the first Critique, he argued that metaphysics proceeded in
three steps or stages, namely dogmatism, skepticism, and the criticism of
pure reason.^188 In the historical part of the (projected) essay, he first gave
a summary of Leibniz's principles, which differed from the outline given
in his response to Eberhard. He now identified the four basic principles of
Leibnizian metaphysics as the principle of the identity of indiscernibles,
the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of preestablished harmony,
and the monadology.^189 Kant called the system of preestablished harmony
"the most peculiar figment ever conceived by philosophy."^190 He squarely
relegates Leibniz (and Wolff) to the first stage of metaphysics. The second
stage of metaphysics, that is, skepticism, he identified with the antinomy
of pure reason as it was discussed in the first Critique. The third stage
was what he called here the "Practical-Dogmatic Transition to the Super¬
sensible."^191 It consisted in the discussion of the three ideas of Freedom
(autonomy), God, and Immortality, as he had put them forward in the
first, second, and third Critiques. In a section entitled "Solution of the
Academic Question" he summarized his own views of rational faith,
transcendental and moral theology, comparing them to the views of the
"Leibniz-Wolffian epoch."^192 Kant points out that Leibniz-Wolffian phi¬
losophy had tried to demonstrate things that he had tried to prove unknow¬
able but believable on sufficient moral grounds. The draft ends with an in¬
teresting summary of Kant's entire philosophy.
Metaphysics has two pivots on which it turns. The first is the doctrine of the ideality
of space and time. It only points to what is supersensible in regard to the theoretical
principles, but which remains unknowable for us. But at the same time it is theoretical-
dogmatic insofar as it has to do with the a priori cognition of objects of experience. The
second is the doctrine of the reality of the concept of freedom as the concept of some¬
thing cognizable and supersensible, in regard to which metaphysics is however only
practical-dogmatic. But both pivots are, as it were, fastened to the post of the concept
of reason concerning the unconditional in the totality of all subordinated conditions.
With it the illusion ought to be removed, which causes an antinomy of pure reason by
confusing appearances with things in themselves. And in this Dialectic itself is con¬
tained the instruction for moving from the sensible to the supersensible.^193
While one might wish that Kant had taken better care in formulating these
sentences, it should be remembered that what we have are a number of
drafts of an essay that Kant never finished.^194