390 Kant: A Biographythe author than he let on to Hippel. We may also be sure that Hippel knew
very well that Kant had a fairly good idea not only of the books he had pub¬
lished anonymously, but also of who the author was. That neither Kant nor
Hippel found this to stand in the way of their friendship is perhaps re¬
markable, but what was even more remarkable was the nature of their con¬
versations about the subjects that Hippel discussed in his works. The wit
and irony involved in this was probably only heightened by the fact that some
of their mutual friends were also aware to varying degrees of some of the
complexities. Hippel himself argued that "oral presentation betrays the way
of thinking," that writing was a pure imitation of speaking, and that "all that
is as great as our art, must be said."^20 Of course, it was not always simply
what was said, but who said it and how he said it.
Scheffner was aware of this, and so were Pörschke and Jensch, but it
was either lost on Kant's earliest biographers, or it was one of those di¬
mensions of Kant's life that they thought were better not talked about.
Hippel was, after all, persona non grata to them, at least after his death.
If they found it embarrassing that Kant continued to honor him, his close
friendship with Hippel between 1786 and 1796 may have been even more
embarrassing to them. Kant, on the other hand, had not just lost another
friend in Hippel, his social and intellectual life had lost a most significant
component.
In the summer of 1797 a notable anatomist and surgeon named Friedrich
Theodor Meckel (1756— 1803) visited Königsberg and also stopped at Kant's
house. He found that Kant's mind had so much declined that it was un¬
reasonable to expect Kant to contribute anything new and original to the
philosophical debate from then on, and he said so publicly. Pörschke came
to Kant's defense, writing to Fichte in July 1798 that Kant might be suf¬
fering from weaknesses brought on by old age, but that this did not mean
"that Kant's mind is already dead. To be sure, he is no longer capable of
extended and concentrated thought; he now lives largely from the rich store
of his memory, but even now he makes exceptional combinations and proj¬
ects."^21 This did not mean that he no longer took as active an interest in
the discussion of his philosophy by others. He complained bitterly about
Fichte. Indeed, it was impossible to mention Fichte and his school with¬
out making Kant angry. On the other hand, "he just dismissed Reinhold
(zuckte die Achseln).''^1 His judgment of Herder was almost as passionate
as his condemnation of Fichte: Herder "wanted to be dictator and liked to
have apostles."^22 Nor was he "satisfied with Beck, preferring commenta¬
tors of "stricter obedience (Observanz)."^23 When someone asked him why