unequivocally propositional, reserving judgement on whether imagistic
thinking, too, is covertly propositional in form.
2 Mentalese versus connectionism
How, then, are propositional thoughts carried in cognition? How is con-
tent represented? Recall that the realist’s view is that propositional at-
titudes – beliefs, desires, and the like – interact with one another causally to
produce behaviour in ways which respect their semantic contents. The
belief that it is dark down in the cellar combines with the desire to see my
way around down there, not randomly, but in such a way as to produce the
intention toWnd some means of illumination. This in turn may combine
with the belief that a torch is available, so as to cause me to carry that torch
in my hand when I go down. How is this possible? How can propositional
attitudes have causal powers which reXect theirrelatedness to the world,as
well as their logical relations with one another, which is distinctive of their
possessing a semantic content? There are really three diVerent, but closely
related, problems in need of solution here.
First, propositional attitudes aresystematic, having contents which are
systematically related to one another, in such a way that anyone capable of
believing (or otherwise thinking) a given content will be capable of believ-
ing or thinking a number of closely related contents. Anyone capable of
believingthat Jane loves Johnwill also be capable of the thoughtthat John
loves Jane. Why should this be so? How is this fact about propositional
attitudes to be explained?
Second, propositional attitudes areproductive, in the sense that anyone
capable of thinking at all will be capable of entertaining unlimitedly many
(or at least, avery greatmany) thoughts. If you can think that Jane has a
mother, then you can think that Jane’s mother has a mother, and that
Jane’s mother’s mother has a mother, and so on (subject, of course, to
limitations of memory and other cognitive space). There is no end to the
new thoughts which thinkers are capable of entertaining. This fact, too, is
in need of explanation.
Third, propositional attitudes interact causally with one another in ways
which respect their semantic contents and component concepts. This was
the point which was closest to the surface in our initial statement of the
problem three paragraphs back. Beliefs and desires interact to cause
intentions, and beliefs interact with other beliefs to generate new beliefs, in
ways which are closely responsive to thecontentsof those states, and by
means of transitions which are generally rational ones. How can this
happen? How can patterns of causality respect semantic relations of entail-
ment and evidential support?
194 Forms of representation