Figure 9.4 Dispositionalist HOT-theory‘conscious’ – whose function is,inter alia, to make its contents available to
HOT. SeeWgure 9.4 above, which envisages two distinct routes for percep-
tual information through cognition – a non-conscious route, and a con-
scious route constituted as such by the availability of the perceptual states
to higher-order thinking. So the perceptual states in C are available to two
kinds of thinking –Wrst-order thinking, generating beliefs and plans relat-
ing to the perceived environment; and second-order thinking, drawing on
the resources of the mind-reading faculty, relating to the nature and
occurrence of those perceptual states themselves. (Note that there are two
distinct ‘thinking boxes’ in the diagram, to one of which conscious ex-
periences are made available and to the other of which non-conscious
experiences are available. In fact, as thorough-going modularists, we
presume that there will be a variety of concept-wielding systems involved
in each case; but we make no assumptions here about which reasoning
systems will take input from C, which from N, and perhaps which from
both.) The entire contents of C – which can, in principle, be as rich and
complex as you please – can then be conscious in the absence of even a
single HOT, provided that the subject remainscapableof entertaining
HOTs about any aspect of its contents. And note that the contents of the
store are justWrst-order percepts, which can then be the objects of HOT –
no re-representation is needed.
It is easy to see how a system with the required structure might have
evolved. Start with a system capable ofWrst-order perception, ideally with
a short-term integrated perceptual memory store whose function is to
present its contents,poised, available for use by various theoretical and
264 Consciousness: theWnal frontier?