faculty to the outputs of our perceptual systems completely transforms the
contents which they carry.
3.8 HOD-theoryDennett (1991a) argues for a form of dispositionalist higher-order theory
similar to that defended above, diVering from it in two main respects.First,
Dennett thinks that our intuitions about phenomenal consciousness all
derive, ultimately, from the availability of states to linguistic description,
and that the insertion ofthoughtsbetween the states in question and our
reports of them (in such a way as to give HOT-theory) is both unnecessary
and ill-motivated. So conscious states get deWned as those which are
available to higher-orderdescription(HOD).
Second, Dennett denies the existence of any short-term memory store
(which he had once believed in – see his 1978b) whose function is to make
its contents available to HODs. Rather, whether a state isavailableto
report turns on whether it is true that itwouldbe reported on in response to
a suitable request or other probe. But then he thinks that the truth-value of
such a counterfactual is likely to be indeterminate in many cases, since tiny
diVerences in the timing and phrasing of any probe may deliver diVerent
results. (Compare the way in which people’s opinions can be manipulated
by appropriate phrasings of the questions, familiar to any pollster.) This
then gives the famous thesis of the radicalindeterminacy of consciousness–
for most mental states, they are neither determinately conscious nor deter-
minately non-conscious; rather, there is no fact of the matter either way.
In what follows we shall set to one side this second strand in Dennett’s
thinking, concentrating on the alleged connection between phenomenal
consciousness and language. This is because Dennett’s case for the indeter-
minacy of consciousness is for the most part built on his rejection of what
he calls ‘Cartesian Theatre’ models of consciousness. But this notion, in
turn, conXates a number of distinct ideas. Many of these are unobjection-
able. And those whichareobjectionable are not ones to which the form of
dispositionalist HOT-theory sketched above need be committed (see Car-
ruthers, 1996c, ch.7). In addition, it seems very implausible that perceptual
contents should be left fragmentary and distributed, as Dennett supposes,
only being (partially) integrated in response to probing. For many of the
purposes of perception require that perceptual contents shouldalreadybe
integrated. Think, for example, of a basketball player selecting, in a
split-second, a team member to receive a pass. The decision may depend
upon many facts concerning the precise distribution of team members and
opponents on the court, which may in turn involve recognition of the
colours of their respective jerseys. It is simply not plausible that all of this
266 Consciousness: theWnal frontier?