4 Conclusion
We have argued in this chapter that there is no good reason to think that
consciousness – focusing particularly on phenomenal consciousness – is
incapable of objective, scientiWcally grounded, explanation. And we have
argued that such consciousness can be given a cognitive explanation in
terms of its availability to higher-order thoughts. So here, too, what
seemed like a potential conXict between common-sense psychology and
science turns out to be illusory.
selected reading
General: Blocket al., 1997, is an excellent collection of nearly 50 articles and
book-parts, containing much of the seminal material in the area.
Mysterianism: Nagel, 1974, 1986; Jackson, 1982, 1986; McGinn, 1991; Chalmers,
1996.
First-order theories: Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995.
Higher-order theories: Armstrong, 1968, 1984; Dennett, 1978b, 1991a; Rosenthal,
1986, 1991a, 1993; Carruthers, 1996c; Lycan, 1996.
Conclusion 271