Kenny, 1963; and many others). Their complaints against the causal thesis,
however, fail to impress us. They claim that oVering reasons is a matter of
providing justiWcation for conduct. So it may be, particularly when you are
oVering reasons on your own behalf. But the reasons for which an agent
acted may be disreputable enough to incriminate, rather than to justify.
And even when agents are sincere in the justiWcations they oVer, folk
psychology is quite ready to believe they may only berationalisations, and
not the real reason.
Simplistic views about causation are often to be found lurking behind
objections to the causal thesis. For example, it is sometimes said that
beliefs and desires (agents’ reasons) cannot be causes of action, because
people who share the same beliefs and desires will often be found to act in
diVerent ways. This argument rests on the principlelike causes produce like
eVects. But in that simple form the principle is not admissible: like causes
only produce like eVectsif relevant circumstances are the same. Anti-
causalists also often urge that the connection between an act and its
motivation belongs ‘in the logical space of reasons’, alleging that reasons
can be evaluatively good or bad, whereas causes just blindly cause. But this
objection fails to observe the important distinction between an intentional
state and its content. The content, ‘Shares in this company are about to
tumble’ is a good reason for selling, but a particular sale will only be
explained if that content is realised in a particular thought in a particular
mind. Indeed, if agents capable of rational choice and deliberation are to
be a causally unmysterious part of the natural order then itmustbe
possible for what is in the logical space of reasons to be causally implemen-
ted.
As well as being committed to a causal connection between reasons
and actions, folk psychology also takesinferenceto be a causal process
(Armstrong, 1973). Ramseyet al. (1990) oVer an example which illustrates
this. On being questioned about his whereabouts the previous evening the
butler testiWes that he spent the night in the hotel in the village and
returned to the chaˆteau on the morning train. Inspector Clouseau con-
cludes that the butler is lying. For Clouseau knows that the hotel is closed
for the season and that the morning train is out of service. Now of course it
is quite possible that Clouseau will realise that both these facts show the
butler to be lying. But it is equally possible that only one of these beliefs
will lead Clouseau to his conclusion. It is an empirical matter whether one
or the other, or both, of his beliefs were engaged in his coming to believe
that the butler is lying.
We can draw out some further causal commitments of folk psychology
by invoking Grice’s (1961) argument that there is a causal condition for
seeing. Grice pointed out that looking in the direction of, say, a particular
36 Folk-psychological commitments