psychologycouldserve all these purposes unless it were through having a
theoreticalcorewhich can be used, quasi-scientiWcally, to generate predic-
tions and explanations. In trying to seduce someone through words or
actions, for example, one has to formexpectationsof the likely eVects on
the other of what one says or does; and one also has to be able tointerpret
accurately the other’s initial responses to one’s overtures.
ScientiWc theories, too, can be put to the service of all sorts of tech-
nological applications, quite apart from their pure central functions of
explanation and prediction. This sort of ‘technological impurity’ surely is
deeply built into the exercise of folk psychology, in its daily application.
But that does not show that folk psychology is incorrect in many of the
predictions and explanations which it yields, or in the theoretical
framework which it uses to generate those predictions and explanations.
On the contrary, it could hardly have served those other purposes so well
for so long if it were not fairly eVective in terms of prediction and
explanation.
Certainly we may wellWnd (or rather, we have already found) that in
many ways folk psychology stands in need of correction. But as a starting
point for scientiWc psychology, the human capacities recognised by folk
psychology are more or less indispensable as subjects for investigation.
The characteristic diVerence which weWnd between folk psychology and
scientiWc psychology is that whereas the folk theory is geared to the
minutiae of individual cases, scientiWc theory is interested rather in general
kindsof process. Thus, I might be concerned whether that look on your
face shows that you have recognised me as I attempt to sneak out of some
disreputable haunt. What scientiWc psychology is interested in explaining is
how our capacity for recognising faces operates in general.
Moreover, as we shall see in chapter 4, developmental psychologists
have discovered a great deal, over the last two decades, about how ‘theory
of mind’ (the basic mind-reading capacity of folk psychology) develops in
children. But although the development of folk psychology (in the normal
pattern, as contrasted with curious impairments and abnormalities) is the
subjectof this sort of developmental inquiry, it is notable that the develop-
mental psychologists also have to makeuse offolk psychology in order to
acquire empirical evidence. Thus the conclusion of these inquiries may be
reported in the sort of general and systematic way appropriate to scientiWc
psychology – as, for example, a conclusion about children’smeta-rep-
resentational abilityat a certain age. But in order to gather the evidence
for any such conclusions, developmental psychologists have toWnd out
what individual childrenbelieveabout the thoughts, desires and actions of
others. In testing what beliefs children have about beliefs, they have to
rely upon folk psychology in assessing what beliefs to attribute to their
Using folk psychology 47