unrecognized contradiction to it—depending on such factors as how rational he is, how conceptually reflective
about his own life, how well-integrated psychologically.
In the course of his development from childhood, a human being encounters certain fundamental facts of reality—
facts about the nature of existence and the nature of man—to which he can respond in a variety of ways and with
varying degrees of rationality and realism. It is the cumulative sum of these responses that constitutes a person's
distinctive sense of life.
For example, it is an inescapable fact of reality that thinking is a necessity of man's existence, i.e., that man requires
knowledge and that the acquisition of knowledge requires the effort or conceptual thought. The position a young
person takes on this issue is not arrived at by explicit decision nor by a single choice. It is arrived at by the
cumulative implication of a long series of choices and responses in the face of specific situations involving the need
to think.
A young person may respond positively and healthily, learning to take an active pleasure in the exercise of his
mind. Or he may approach intellectual effort grudgingly and dutifully, viewing it, in effect, as a "necessary evil."
Or he may regard intellectual effort with lethargic resentment or fear, viewing it as an unfair burden and imposition,
and determine to avoid it whenever possible. What gradually forms and hardens in his psychology is a trend, a
policy, a habit—a position or premise by implication. It is in this manner that all sense-of-life attitudes are formed.
There are many issues involved in a person's sense of life; they include, but are not limited to, the following:
It is a fact of reality, as I have stressed throughout this book, that man is neither omniscient nor infallible. A young
person discovers, very early, not only that his knowledge must be acquired by process of thought, but that there is
no guarantee, in any given case, that his effort will necessarily and automatically be successful. He may accept the
responsibility of thought and judgment willingly, realistically, and fearlessly, fully prepared to bear the
consequences of his conclusions (and subsequent actions), recognizing that no rational alternative to his policy is
possible. Or he may react with fear and with a longing to escape responsibility—by shrinking the area of his
thought and action so as to minimize the "risks"