T h e “ Qu a l i t y ” o f F i n a n c i a l S t a t e me n t s
Financial Statements,
Cash Flow, and Taxes
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ONLINE/PHOTOLIBRARY
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CHAPTER
54
The financial statements presented in a typical
company’s annual report look quite official. They
are signed by the firm’s top executives and are
certified by a Big Four accounting firm, so one
would think that they must be accurate. That
may not be true, though, for three reasons: legiti-
mate misjudgments in valuing assets and mea-
suring costs, “flexible” accounting rules that
result in differently reported results for similar
companies, and outright cheating.
One blatant example of cheating involved
WorldCom, which reported asset values that
exceeded their true value by about $11 billion.
This led to an understatement of costs and a cor-
responding overstatement of profits. Enron is
another example. That company overstated the
value of certain assets, reported those artificial
value increases as profits, and transferred the
assets to subsidiary companies to hide the true
facts. Enron’s and WorldCom’s investors eventu-
ally learned what was happening, the companies
were forced into bankruptcy, their top execu-
tives went to jail, the accounting firm that audited
their books was forced out of business, and mil-
lions of investors lost billions of dollars.
After the Enron and WorldCom blowups,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
which required companies to improve their
internal auditing standards and required the CEO
and CFO to certify that the financial statements
were properly prepared. The SOX bill also cre-
ated a new watchdog organization to help make
sure that the outside accounting firms were
doing their job. From all indications, financial
statements are generally more accurate and
clearer than they were in the past.
But the world is dynamic, and a new account-
ing problem surfaced in 2007. Big banks, most
notably Citigroup, owned many risky but high-
yielding subprime mortgages. The banks
invented a complex legal procedure that they
called a structured investment vehicle (SIV) to
conceal the fact that they held all of these risky
mortgages. They correctly feared that people
wouldn’t want to do business with a risky bank.
But when the subprime market fell apart in 2007,