to colonial imperialism had already exposed this professional class to the application of
force for the benefit of a negligible section of the society. Taken further, the aura of
intimidation within which they operated in those days had taught them to perpetuate it
whenever the opportunity offered itself in the newly independent countries. And as Ruth
First argues: “More than anything else, colonial administrations resembled armies. The
chain of authority from the top downwards was untouched by any principle of
representation or consultation. For long periods in some territories, indeed, the colonial
administration not only resembled armies, in their paramilitary formation and ethos; they
were... the instruments of military men (cited in Arnold 2005: 114). The foregoing
becomes yet another evidence that points to the unlikelihood of leadership performance
on the part of the military. The tutelage acquired in the colonial days was to strongly
influence the manner in which they perceived themselves as against the rest of the nation.
As an institutional product of colonialism, the tendency of ordering difference in the
post-independence era was a natural thing to do, as by the virtue of their position they
saw how it worked to the exclusive advantage of the colonial system. Besides, there was
also post-independence external motivation for both the Ghanaian and Nigerian military
to take over power for the purpose of class privilege:
Nigerian and Ghanaian army officers who served in the Congo under UN auspices saw
at first hand the power of the soldiers to arbitrate or coerce politicians and took such
lessons home with them. African armies soon learnt that their interventions could be
decisive. (Arnold 15)A combination of all these various orientations had resulted in the creation of a distinctly
separate identity and psychology. What is more, although this class affirmed its
membership of each of the nations and put forward a strong reason that verged on
patriotism and nationalism for taking over power, reeling off all the atrocities of the
civilian politicians, the memory it bore of its past orientation was poles apart from what
others had in mind. Maurice Halbwachs’ (1950: 48) view on collective memory will
serve to illustrate this better: “While the collective memory endures and draws strength
from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who
remember”. Remembrance in this case becomes group-bound. What a group therefore
chooses to remember is contingent upon the prospect to enhance the status and gains of