Instead it preferred to avoid diplomacy and to restrict the conflict to
the arena of violence, in which a superpower facing no deterrent is
bound to prevail over a T hird W orld adversary.
As already discussed, the US regularly carries out or supports
aggression, even in cases far more criminal than Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait. Only the most dedicated commissar can fail to understand
these facts, or the fact that in the rare case when the US happens
to oppose some illegal act by a client or ally, it’s quite happy with
“linkage.”
Take the South African occupation of Namibia, declared illegal by
the World Court and the UN in the l960s. T he US pursued “quiet
diplomacy” and “constructive engagement” for years, brokering a
settlement that gave South Africa ample reward (including Namibia’s
major port) for its aggression and atrocities, with “linkage”
extending to the Caribbean and welcome benefits for international
business interests.
T he Cuban forces that had defended Namibia’s neighbor Angola
from South African attack were withdrawn. Much as in Nicaragua
after the 1987 “peace accords,” the US is continuing to support the
terrorist army backed by the US and its allies (South Africa and
Zaire) and is preparing the ground for a 1992 Nicaragua-style
“democratic election,” where people will go to the polls under the
threat of economic strangulation and terrorist attack if they vote
the wrong way.
Meanwhile, South Africa was looting and destroying Namibia, and
using it as a base for violence against its neighbors. In the Reagan-
Bush years (l980–88) alone, South African violence led to about $60
billion in damage and over a million and a half people killed in the
neighboring countries (excluding Namibia and South Africa). But the
commissar class was unable to see these facts, and hailed George
Bush’s amazing display of principle as he opposed “linkage”—when
someone steps on our toes.
More generally, opposing “linkage” amounts to little more than
rejecting diplomacy, which always involves broader issues. In the
case of Kuwait, the US position was particularly flimsy. After
Saddam Hussein stepped out of line, the Bush administration insisted
that Iraq’s capacity for aggression be eliminated (a correct position,
in contrast to its earlier support for Saddam’s aggression and
atrocities) and called for a regional settlement guaranteeing
security. Well, that’s linkage. T he simple fact is that the US feared
ann
(Ann)
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