Although anthropologists are predictably concerned about the way people on the street
understand their religion (see, e.g., Jean Comaroff, Body of Power), they also have tradi-
tionally devoted some time to understanding how religious experts interpret and under-
stand religious symbolism. See, e.g., Reichel-Dolmatoff, Amazonian Cosmos. Silverstein
notes that “institutions with procedural formalism, e.g., religion, law, etc., are particularly
prone to ‘expert/lay’ divergences” in perspective between those controlling the institutions
and those otherwise inhabiting them. Silverstein, personal communication, 10/11/05.
- Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point when he urges that we pay attention to
professional ideologies, which he terms the “internal, participants’ point of view,” in un-
derstanding law, pointing to law as an “argumentative” practice. Dworkin, Law’s Empire
13–14. - Sociolegal scholars studying legal practitioners have turned up many examples of
informal ideologies and views of the legal profession. See, e.g., Conley and O’Barr, Rules
versus Relationships (views of small claims court judges); Pierce, Gender Trials (views of
attorneys and paralegals); Sarat and Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers (views of divorce attorneys
about law and the legal system); Sarat, When the State Kills (views of death penalty defense
attorneys). - Scholars in sociolegal studies have for some time been demonstrating that law in
the United States is anything but a level playing field. Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come
Out Ahead.” In the legal academy, other successors to the legal realist movement from the
fields of critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory, along with
other critical scholars, have added strong critiques pointing out the ways that apparently
neutral aspects of law are in fact heavily value-laden. See, e.g., Bartlett and Kennedy, Femi-
nist Legal Theory; Cover, Justice Accused; Crenshaw et al., Critical Race Theory; Fineman,
Illusion of Equality; Kelman, Guide to Critical Legal Studies;Critical Legal Studies special
issue;^1 Williams, Alchemy. There have been allied critiques of the methods and content of
American legal education. See, e.g., Bell, “Black Students in White Law Schools”; Hantzis,
“Kingsfield and Kennedy”; Kalman, “To Hell with Langdell!”; D. Kennedy, Legal Educa-
tion and the Reproduction of Hierarchy; Menkel-Meadow, “Portia in a Different Voice”;
Romero et al., “The Legal Education of Chicago Students.” - See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified; Althouse, “The Lying Woman”;
Ansley, “Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education”; Frug, “Re-Reading Contracts”;
Lawrence, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection”; Matsuda, “When the First Quail Calls.”
There are actually three issues here: (1) the “on the ground” administration of justice
in multiple legal and quasi-legal settings; (2) the implicit skewing hidden within formal le-
gal categories, epistemology, and forms of discourse; and (3) the differential inclusion of
“outsider” students and perspectives from law school classroom discussions. Interestingly,
the second issue, which is the discourse structure of legal language, mediates the other two;
it is one of the most obvious bridges connecting the two quite different social settings (law
in practice, law school training). I would argue that the invisibilities and silences that emerge
during the inculcation of legal language in law school classrooms become hardened and
habitual through multiple means in the administration of justice (linguistic and nonlinguistic,
to be sure, but at least one of the linguistic means is the core of formal metalinguistic struc-
turing outlined in this volume). In the process, it becomes less relevant what a student’s
background is, for once someone has thoroughly internalized the metalinguistic system of
legal reasoning, she or he will begin to habitually marginalize some aspects of social context
and morally grounded reasoning. (This does not mean that he or she will inevitably turn
away from alterative languages and points of view—even within the rich realm of diverse
legal professional “dialects”—but it does mean that a new kind of “bilingualism” will be
necessary, and it will take some additional effort to maintain these multiple perspectives.)
228 Notes to Page 14