Wortham, “Linguistic Anthropology of Education”; see also Collins and
Slembrouck, “Reading Shop Windows,” 21, who build on Silverstein’s framework to
demonstrate how “particular ‘micro’ contextual meanings are always construed in
terms of a potentially open and sequentially-enacted series of higher-order ‘macro’
contextual assumptions.”
John Austin, Province of Jurisprudence; Dworkin, Law’s Empire; on H. L. A. Hart
and others, see also Mertz and Weissbourd, “Legal Ideology and Linguistic Theory”;
Weissbourd and Mertz, “Rule-Centrism versus Legal Creativity.”
See, e.g., Levi, Introduction; Minow, Making All the Difference; Solan, Language of
Judges; Williams, Alchemy; Winter, Clearing in the Forest; D. Kennedy, “Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication”; see generally Bishin and Stone, Law, Language and
Ethics. Elkins notes the close relationship between “thinking like a lawyer” and “speaking
like a lawyer.” Elkins, “The Legal Persona,” 741–742.
Levi, Introduction; G. Edward White and Jason Freitag also make similar argu-
ments. G. E. White, The Marshall Court (attributing power to shifting cultural ideas and
intellectual history in the development of doctrine); Freitag, “Translating” (tracks the lin-
guistic genealogy of the phrase “due process” through multiple historical periods). See
G. E. White, “The Marshall Court,” for an interesting account of the evolution of doctrine
in piracy cases.
J. B. White, Justice as Translation.
See D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy; Williams,
Alchemy. There is also a growing literature on the language used in particular legal set-
tings, from courtrooms to law offices of various kinds. See, e.g., Conley and O’Barr, Just
Words; Danet, “Language in the Legal Process”; Frohmann, “Discrediting Victims’ Alle-
gations”; Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering; Lazarus-Black, “Rites of Domination”;
Maynard,Inside Plea Bargaining; Matoesian, Reproducing Rape and Law and the Language
of Identity; Philips, Ideology; Sarat and Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers.
Areeda, “The Socratic Method”; Condlin, “Socrates’ New Clothes”; Groves, “To-
ward a More Effective Program”; Heffernan, “Not Socrates, but Protagoras”; D. Kennedy,
Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy; Landman, “Anent the Case Method”;
Vitiello, “Professor Kingsfield.” There have also been a number of histories and social sci-
ence studies of law school education. See, e.g., Stevens, Law School; Stover, Making It and
Breaking It; and relevant discussion in Friedman, A History of American Law; see also the
early major review of the literature in this area by Maru, Research on the Legal Profession.
Thus, for example, commentators have had to distinguish among various kinds
of Socratic teaching, at times lumping somewhat different teaching styles under the same
label. See Cramton, “Current State of the Law School Curriculum”; Morgan, “The Case
Method.” As Vitiello notes, a “readily accepted definition” of the Socratic method isn’t
easy to find. Vitiello, “Professor Kingsfield,” 961.
See ABA, Report and Recommendations: The Role of Law Schools, 13; Rhode, In the
Interests of Justice; Teich, “Research on American Law Teaching,” 170. Hawkins-León states
that “the two primary methods of law teaching today are the Socratic Method and the Prob-
lem Method,” with Socratic teaching dominating. Hawkins-León, “The Socratic Method,”
Some scholars, however, claim that the Socratic method is on the wane. Shaffer and
Redmount,Lawyers, Law Students, and People; Kerr, “Decline.” As we will see in Chapter 7,
the results of these studies still leave us somewhat unclear as to the actual trajectory of law
school teaching, in part because of the lack of a uniform definition of “Socratic method,” in
part because they rely on self-report rather than observational data, and in part because we
have no comparable data from earlier periods of time against which to assess their claims.
