influenced by the thought that were we to permit the dilemmas involved in coding race to
dissuade us from going forward, yet another study would emerge with information only
on gender, leaving a continuing silence on racial dynamics in the law school classroom.
- I have mentioned age as another possible consideration. I also would add sexual
preference, an identity about which we were unable to collect any systematic information
in this study.
Part IV
- Schlegel, “Walt Was Right,” 604.
Chapter 9
- See, e.g., Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism; Abrams, “Title VII and the Complex
Female Subject”; Coombe, “Contesting the Self”; Larson, “Imagine Her Satisfaction.” - Even the title of an article reporting findings from the study makes this generaliz-
ing premise evident: see Boersma et al., “Sex Differences in College Student-Teacher In-
teractions: Fact or Fantasy?” This title presupposes that the results of a single study can
definitively answer the question whether or how gender works in all classrooms. - Id., 783.
- Constantinople et al., “The Chilly Climate,” 549.
- Smith, Cognitive Styles, 131.
- Id.
- Zemans and Rosenblum, The Making of a Public Profession, 57.
- Granfield, Making Elite Lawyers; McGill, “Producing Lawyers.”
- See Mertz, “A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies,” 1246–1248.
- Catherine Krupnick has urged a similarly complex and contextual approach to
creating more egalitarian sites for learning. Krupnick, “Women and Men in the Class-
room,” 25. - R. Austin, “Bad for Business.”
- Auerbach, Unequal Justice, 276.
- Elkins, “The Legal Persona,” 742–743. Note the covert nature of this semiotic
mediation, which characterizes a very social categorization process as above subjectivity,
thereby concealing its own social origins. Elkins draws on Scheingold’s observation that
the legal worldview is “more deluding than some other[s]” in that it perpetuates a myth
that “thinking like a lawyer” is actually the equivalent of performing objective analysis that
“strip[s] a problem, any problem, down to its essentials.” Scheingold, Politics of Rights,
161, cited in Elkins, “The Legal Persona,” 740–741. Ironically, subscribing to this myth
means that those trained to “think like a lawyer” have no training that would allow them
to “critically analyz[e] and assess[] the assumptions underlying the lawyer’s peculiar view
of the world.” Id. - Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 144–160.
- Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even.
- Williams, Alchemy, 163–164.
- Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead”; R. Austin, “Bad for Business”;
Winter,A Clearing in the Forest. Fish describes law as “at once thoroughly rhetorical and
engaged in effacing its own rhetoricity.” Fish, “The Law Wishes,” 195. - Baker, “Language Acculturation Practices,” 134–135.
- Id., 134.
- Id.
Notes to Pages 203–214 269