c CUNYB/Clarke December, :
Metaphysics in a Hornet’s Nest (–)
or is an illusion and pretence, it is impossible to be mistaken in this judgment and
that they not be,for any person who has the capacity to enter into themselves, as some
people have, and to make the judgmentthat they are.Itisatruth – as perceptible by
reason as the Sun is to healthy eyes – that action presupposes being, that it is necessary
foracause to exist in order to act, and that it is impossible for something that does not
exist to do anything.
Silhon anticipated the Cartesian project at least in this sense. He saw
clearly the impact of sceptical doubts on proofs of the soul’s immortality
or of God’s existence, and he believed that he had to address those doubts
adequately before he could make any progress with those two questions.
It would be merely a change of emphasis if Descartes were to argue that
scepticism about knowledge of nature, whether it is adequately countered
or not, provides a foil against which the relative certainty of self-awareness
is obvious.
The most likely source of these sceptical problems was the publication
in Paris inof a Latin translation of Sextus Empiricus.Theologians
and philosophers exploited its riches to undermine the claims of adver-
saries, irrespective of what was being debated or who the adversaries
happened to be. Catholic theologians, for example, could use such scep-
tical weapons against what they considered undue reliance on reason by
Calvinists, and could then encourage the faithful to put their trust in the
traditional teachings of the church. Calvinists, for their part, could appeal
to sceptical arguments to challenge the alleged credulity of Catholics,
some of whose beliefs seemed to verge on magic. Marie de Gournay could
deploy similar sceptical arguments to challenge received views about the
inferiority of women.
A more immediate source of sceptical arguments, however, were the
very influentialEssaysof Michel de Montaigne, published in various edi-
tions betweenand.Montaigne rehearsed, in hisApology for
Raymond Sebond, all three of the famous sceptical arguments that appear
in the first of Descartes’Meditations.Heargued that our senses often
deceive us, that we cannot be sure if we are awake or asleep, and that we
cannot use our cognitive faculties to establish their own trustworthiness
without arguing in a circle.Thus one factor in Descartes’ decision to
structure theMeditationsas he wrote them, with the First Meditation
rehearsing the strongest possible sceptical arguments available, was the
popularity of Montaigne’sEssaysand the fashionable scepticism that they
endorsed.