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category that really mattered.x The Japanese were unaware that the Americans had advance warning
of Yamamoto’s plan. American intelligence agents had managed to
partially decipher their code; thus, the American commanders knew
the basic outline of the Japanese strategy, including the fact that
Midway was the target and when the Japanese intended to strike it.x Yamamoto’s American counterpart was Admiral Chester Nimitz,
a tough, no-nonsense leader with a long career in the navy. In the
aftermath of Pearl Harbor, he was appointed commander-in-chief
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the battle were the highly experienced carrier commander Jack
Fletcher and Raymond Spruance, known for his calm demeanor and
calculating mind.x Once he knew Yamamoto’s plan, Nimitz saw an opportunity to
turn the tables and potentially deliver a serious blow. He heavily
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B-17 bombers there. He positioned his carriers 325 miles northeast of
the island, where he hoped they could ambush Yamamoto’s carriers.The Battle
x At dawn on June 4, the main Japanese carrier group launched a
strike force of 108 planes against Midway. Fighter planes from
Midway intercepted it, and the outdated and outclassed American
planes were shot down by the faster, more maneuverable, more
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x Meanwhile, both sides had been deploying reconnaissance aircraft
to search for the other. Most of Nagumo’s reconnaissance planes
were launched by catapults from his heavy cruisers. One, Number
4, was half an hour late taking off from the cruiser Tone because
of problems with its catapult. As chance would have it, the sector
of ocean that this plane had been assigned to search was the one