Forest Products, Livelihoods and Conservation

(Darren Dugan) #1
192 Trading forest products in South-Eastern Zimbabwe

a tourist or a local. The buyer’s willingness to bargain indicated by exiting the
car and moving around the market gives the trader extra time to bargain. The
situation is different when the buyer remains in the car, asking prices through
the window. Traders will then have to give buyers favourable bargains as they
are likely to leave at any time. Through participatory activities with traders
and buyers it was observed that buyers travel into Zimbabwe by road acquiring
some information on product diversity and prices. By the time they travel
back to South Africa, they will be more aware of the products they want to
buy and the place to acquire them. Each trader bargains individually with the
buyer until a price is established. Such ‘private treaty’ negotiations are very
common in woodcarving marketing. As such the resulting fairness of prices
depends upon the information, trading skills and relative bargaining power of
buyers and sellers. Prices discovered in this way tend to vary with every
transaction. Although individual traders transact with buyers, the information
from the transaction is never private, but being shared amongst traders. This
gives the woodcarving markets one characteristic of organised central markets.
This information sharing is essential because traders are able to sell products
controlled by other traders when those other traders are absent from the
market. It is often the case that only a proportion of the market sellers are at
the market at any one point in time (approximately 20%, depending on the
time of the year).

THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Rules regulating markets
Only five of the markets in Chivi District on the Masvingo–Beitbridge road
operate with the full approval of the Chivi RDC. The rest either operate illegally
or their registration with the council has not been ratified. In 1992 the RDC,
seeing the potential of the woodcraft sector to raise revenues for itself, levied
a tax on all participants involved at the retail level. Because of labor shortages
in collecting fees, the expected revenues were never realised. In the Masvingo
Urban Council the market rules are more stringent (Table 3). For someone to
be given a stall at the Masvingo urban market, the person has to be a ‘resident
of the town’. Defaulters on market rentals risk the disconnection of their
residential water supply. Formerly, Mwenezi RDC, also along the Masvingo–
Beitbridge road, charged a monthly rental of Z$150 for marketing space and
an extra monthly charge of Z$30 for defaulters. By 1999 these fees had dropped,
perhaps indicating a slackening of the system of rules. The fees reduced the
development of the sector in that district as many people from Mwenezi cross
the Runde River to market their products in Chivi District, where rules were
less stringently adhered to. In Chivi, the level of control of markets by the
district office is greater when the market has more participants.
Most markets on the Masvingo–Beitbridge road have a committee that runs
the affairs of the market. Some barriers to entry in the craft sector exist as
most markets have joining fees that range from Z$10 to Z$75 depending on
the infrastructure of the particular market. These fees are paid to the
committee that runs the affairs of the market. A common feature at most

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