In Matter of Magid, 139 N.J. 449 (1995), a First
Assistant Prosecutor was charged with an act of domestic
violence. The assistant prosecutor was later convicted of
simple assault in municipal court pursuant to a plea
bargain. The Court noted that, as a prosecutor, the
respondent had a duty to combat domestic violence, not
commit it. The Court noted that respondent’s assault
was an isolated one, and that the respondent had suffered
professionally as a result of negative publicity. The Court
ordered a public reprimand, but it cautioned that in the
future the Court will ordinarily suspend an attorney
convicted of an act of domestic violence. Accord Matter of
Principato, 139 N.J. 456 (1995).
Criminal convictions are given conclusive effect in
disciplinary proceedings and underlying facts in support
of convictions need not be individually reviewed in order
to determine whether a breach of ethics has occurred.
The facts may be considered, however, in assessing the
appropriateness of discipline and the severity of the
sanction to be imposed. When an ethical violation so
patently offends the elementary standards of a lawyer’s
professional duty, it per se warrants disbarment. Matter
of Conway, 107 N.J. 168 (1987); see also, State v.
McCann, 110 N.J. 496 (1988).
An attorney may be subject to a disciplinary hearing
and subsequent sanctions, including disbarment, if there
is clear and convincing evidence that the attorney’s
conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct,
notwithstanding that he was acquitted on criminal
charges arising out of that same conduct. Matter of
Rigolosi, 107 N.J. 192 (1987); see also, State v. Scher, 278
N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J.
276 (1995); State v. McCoy, 261 N.J. Super. 202 (Law
Div. 1992).
VII. HYBRID REPRESENTATION
A trial court, in its discretion, may permit hybrid
representation, i.e. both pro se and legal counsel. State v.
Long, 216 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 1987); State v.
McCleary, 149 N.J. Super. 26 (1977). Such joint
representation, however, is to be avoided whenever
possible. State v. Pratts, 145 N.J. Super. 79, 89 (App. Div.
1975), aff’d 71 N.J. 399 (1976). Accord, State v. Roth,
289 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 146
N.J. 68 (1996). When a defendant is given hybrid
representation, he cannot claim prejudice or attack the
representation on constitutional grounds. State v. Cook,
330 N.J. Super. 395, 414 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
N.J. (2000).
VIII. INTERVIEWING JURORS AFTER TRIAL
In State v. Riley, 216 N.J. Super. 383 (App. Div.
1987), the Court held that an attorney did not violate R.
1:16-1, which prohibits litigants, their attorneys, or
agents from engaging in post-trial interviews with jurors
because the initial, chance meeting was not a deliberate,
willful investigatory effort, notwithstanding the
attorney’s arrangement to meet with the juror again.
Further, the Court held that even if the attorney had
violated R. 1:16-1, the information obtained during the
meeting would not be inadmissible per se in a hearing to
determine whether defendant was denied a fair trial.In State v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div.
1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 276 (1995), a defense
investigator flagrantly violated R. 1:16-1 and a trial court
order when he interviewed two jurors following
defendant’s jury trial. Defendant then used the
information to impeach the jury’s verdict. Although
acknowledging defense counsel’s ethical violation, the
Appellate Division ruled that counsel still could use the
information to impeach the verdict.