cdTOCtest

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6h provides that is a third-degree
crime for a person with fraudulent intent to knowingly
use a counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen or
fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain property or
services. It is also a third-degree crime for a person with
unlawful or fraudulent intent to furnish, acquire, or use
an actual or fictitious credit card, whether alone or
together with names of credit cardholders, or other
information pertinent to a credit card account in any
form.

II. OVERLAPPING STATUTES

In State v. Gledhill, 67 N.J. 565 (1975), the question
presented in this pre-Code case was whether one who
utters a false or forged credit card with intent to damage
or defraud another may be prosecuted under N.J.S.A.
2A:109-1b, a section of the forgery statute, or whether
prosecution had to come under N.J.S.A. 2A:111-43, a
section of the credit card act. The Supreme Court held
that the fact that both N.J.S.A. 2A:109-1b and N.J.S.A.
2A:111-43 would apply to the same type of conduct and
that the credit card act was a later enactment dealing
specifically with offenses stemming from the possession
of use of credit cards does not mandate a conclusion that
prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2A:109-1b was precluded.
Specific conduct may violate more than one statute.

III. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A CREDIT CARD

Where the owner of the credit card had no knowledge
of its use in a car rental transaction, and where the rental
agency, unaware of the perpetrated fraud, furnished the
automobile to the user, such unauthorized use amounted
to a conversion and a criminal offense. Zuppa v. Hertz
Corporation, 111 N.J. Super. 419, 421, 423 (Cty. Ct.
1970). Unauthorized use may also result in disbarment
even without a criminal conviction. In re Maurello, 121
N.J. 466, 479-82 (1990).

CRUEL AND UNUSUALCRUEL AND UNUSUALCRUEL AND UNUSUALCRUEL AND UNUSUALCRUEL AND UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENTPUNISHMENTPUNISHMENTPUNISHMENTPUNISHMENT

The Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution and Article I, ¶ 12 of the New Jersey

Constitution both prohibit the imposition of “cruel and

unusual” punishment. This provision is irrelevant to

situations which do not involve the imposition of penal

sanctions. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 37 (1976).

The state and federal constitutions impose a three

part test to determine whether a punishment is cruel and

unusual. First, does the punishment for the crime

conform with contemporary standards of decency?

Second, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to

the offense? Third, does the punishment go beyond what

is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological

objective? Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001,

77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. 580,

588 (2000); State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 556-57

(1994). Using this analysis, the United States Supreme

Court has determined that imposition of the death

penalty for a crime less than murder violates the Eighth

Amendment, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97

S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (death

sentence for rape), as is a statute which permits the

imposition of the death penalty upon a person less than

16 years of age. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,

108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988); Stanford v.

Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d

306 (1989).

I. KINDS OF PUNISHMENT IMPOSED

The legislature has broad authority to determine the

types of and limits on punishment imposed for crimes.

United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336, 118 S.Ct.

2028, 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); Solem v. Helm,

463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637;

State v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 184 (1999). Few

punishments are judged to be so severe as to violate the

cruel and unusual punishment clause. In Solem v. Helm,

however, the Supreme Court determined that a life

sentence without possibility of parole imposed upon a

defendant convicted of uttering a bad check under a

recidivist statute was grossly disproportionate to the

offense committed. In making its determination, the

Court analyzed (1) the gravity of the offense and the

harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on

other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether

more serious crimes were subjected to the same penalty