against him. Such testimony may support an inference
that the witness’ testimony is the product of his desire to
curry favor with the State. See also, State v. Wiggins, 158
N.J. Super. 27, 35 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Miller, 144
N.J. Super. 91, 94 (App. Div. 1976).
In State v. Spano, 69 N.J. 231 (1976), the
prosecution failed to disclose to the defense that its chief
witness received favorable treatment in another matter
through a conditional discharge. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that this arrangement should have
been disclosed to the defense because it might have
demonstrated the witness’ motive for testifying for the
State.
Similarly, in State v. Gray, 67 N.J. 144 (1975), the
defendant’s accomplice, in return for favorable treatment
by the State, testified as a prosecution witness. The trial
court only permitted defense counsel on the issue of bias
to examine this witness with regard to how much shorter
the witness’ sentence would be as a result of the favorable
treatment accorded the witness. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey found that this was an improper, but
harmless, limitation on cross-examination with respect to
the witness’ possible bias. See also State v. Bicanich, 132
N.J. Super. 393, 395-396 (App. Div. 1973), aff’d o.b., 66
N.J. 557 (1975). Cf. State v. Balthrop, 92 N.J. 542
(1983) (Trial court erred by excluding prior narcotics
convictions to attack credibility of prosecution’s witness,
where prosecution would not suffer undue prejudice).
For purposes of showing bias, it is irrelevant whether
or not there exists an actual agreement for favorable
treatment between the witness and the prosecution. In
State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 78 N.J. 399 (1978), the trial court refused to
permit cross-examination of a prosecution witness with
regard to whether the prosecution terminated a general
investigation into the witness’ business dealings in return
for the witness’ testimony. The trial court felt that the
objective non-existence of such an agreement vitiated any
need for cross-examination on bias. The Appellate
Division held that this was error. There is no necessity for
an actual quid pro quo between the prosecution and a
witness; it is sufficient if a witness may believe that he will
be rewarded for his testimony. This is true even if the
investigation into the witness’ background is not
necessarily criminal in nature. The defense is entitled to
develop the essential facts which may create bias in the
witness.
Even the mere pendency of charges or an
investigation relating to a prosecution witness is a topic
for cross-examination, and the denial of an expectation of
leniency is not a basis for barring or curtailing cross-
examination. State v. Landano, 271 N.J. Super. 1, 40-41
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 164 (1994).A cross-examiner does not have license to roam at will
under the guise of impeaching the witness, and there may
be limitation on bias, for example, under N.J.R.E. 403.
State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 473 (1955); State v. Mance,
supra at 59-62; State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 375
(App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1992).VII. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
The admission of articles in the form of
demonstrative evidence is a matter within the discretion
of a trial court and is governed by the general principles
of materiality that probative force must be weighed
against such counterfactors as confusion of the issue or
inflaming the jury. See also e.g., State v. Feaster, 156 N.J.
1, 82 (1998) (use of mannequin with knitting needle
inserted in head to show trajectory of bullets permissible,
but trial court would not allow prosecution to dress
mannequin in victim’s clothing and wig); State v.
Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 434-35 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997) (replica bat and broom
handle used in sexual assault permissible); Wimberly v.
Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 608-09 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 38 N.J. 340 (1962). The State may use
demonstrative aids even if somewhat cumulative to other
evidence. State v. Grunow, 199 N.J. Super. 241, 253
(App. Div. 1985), aff’d 102 N.J. 133 (1986).The use of drawings made by a brain-damaged
person to compare to drawings made by the defendant,
to show that the defendant had no such damage, was not
illustrative or demonstrative evidence, but rather
impermissible substantive evidence to show that the
defendant was not impaired. State v. Raso, 321 N.J.
Super. 5 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 161 N.J. 332 (1999).Demonstrative evidence in the form of tests and
experiments is governed by a similar discretionary
standard. Such experiments may be conducted if they
tend to enlighten the trier of fact on a significant issue.
However, they must be within the scope of the evidence
presented at trial. State v. Gear, 115 N.J. Super. 151,
154-55 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 59 N.J. 270 (1971),
and may not be conducted during summation. State v.
LiButti, 146 N.J. Super. 565, 572 (App. Div. 1977).In State v. LiButti, supra, the prosecutor in
summation engaged in an experiment to show how long