for sympathy, protection and advice. See also, e.g., State
v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150, 163 (1990); State v. Tirone, 64 N.J.
222, 226-27 (1974); State v. Balles, 47 N.J. 331, 338
(1966), app. dism’d and cert. denied, 388 U.S. 471
(1967); State v. Ramos, 203 N.J. Super. 197 (Law Div.
1985), aff’d, 226 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 1988). It
permits the State to negate the inference from a victim’s
silence that the victim was not sexually assaulted. State v.
Hill, supra. Because the evidence is admitted to show that
a complaint was made, no details of the complaint are
admissible. Id. at 165; State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super.
368, 418 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466
(1997). The evidence is admitted for the limited purpose
that a complaint was made; it is not permitted to
corroborate the alleged offense. State v. J.S., 222 N.J.
Super. 247, 256-57 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J.
588, 589 (1988). The details should be those minimally
necessary to identify the subject matter of the complaint.
Id.
Thus, the third party evidence should be limited to
a recitation of when the complaint was made, by whom
it was made, the sexual accusation against the defendant
as the assailant and sufficient details of the complaint to
intelligibly indicate its nature. State v. Balles, supra, 47
N.J. at 338-39.
The underlying theory of fresh complaint evidence is
that in the absence of such evidence the jury will draw a
natural inference, adverse to the credibility of the formal
criminal complaint and the complainant. The jury
should be instructed with regard to the limited use for
which the evidence has been admitted. State v. Bethune,
121 N.J. 137, 147-48 (1990).
Fresh complaints made in response to general non-
coercive questioning are permitted. State v. Hill, 121 N.J.
at 167. There is more latitude with the type and extent
of questioning permitted when young children are
involved. State v. Bethune, supra; State v. Ramos, supra
(court finds admissible discussion between child victim
and her mother, subsequent to child’s bringing home
school material designed to assist parents in discussing
sexual matters with their children which resulted in the
victim’s mother cautioning child not to allow anyone to
touch her private parts. This discussion prompted the
victim to ask whether this included defendant and to
indicate that defendant had touched her private parts.
The child’s delay in making the complaint was justifiable
given child’s age and the circumstances surrounding the
child’s giving of the statement to her mother). Cf. State
v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 541-42 (1968) (out of court
identification held admissible as a spontaneous
declaration, although made in response to inquiry, where
declarant was in a state of excitement when she made the
identification); State v. Balles, 47 N.J. at 334-39; State v.
Kozarski, 143 N.J. Super. 12, 17 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 71 N.J. 532 (1976).However, statements procured by pointed, inquisi-
tive, coercive interrogation lack the voluntariness
necessary to be a valid fresh complaint. State v. Hill, 121
N.J. at 167; State v. Bethune, 121 N.J. at 145. Factors to
be considered include the age of the victim; the victim’s
relationship with the interrogator, whether friend,
relative, professional counselor, or authoritarian figure;
who initiated the discussions, and the type of questions
asked, i.e., whether they are leading and their specificity
regarding the alleged abuser and the acts alleged. Id.The doctrine is somewhat misnamed. To constitute
a “fresh” complaint there need not be a high degree of
contemporaneity between the sexual offense and the time
of the complaint. The only temporal requirement is that
the complaint occur within a reasonable time after the
sexual offense. See also, State v. Tirone, supra, 64 N.J. at- A determination of what is a reasonable period of
time depends upon an evaluation of the nature of the
offense and the victim, the natural reluctance of a victim
to speak of a sexual assault, and any other relevant
circumstances such as the victim’s fear of the defendant
or some relationship between the victim and the
defendant which would deter an earlier complaint. See
also State v. Kozarski, 143 N.J. Super. at 16; State v.
Hummel, 132 N.J. Super. at 423. Indeed, numerous
complaints made substantial periods of time after sexual
assaults have been held to come within the fresh
complaint rule. See also, State v. Queen, 221 N.J. Super.
601, 605, 608 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 506
(1988) (two day interval); State v. Kozarski (two week
interval); State v. Hummel (four to six weeks interval). The
court in Hummel, 132 N.J. Super. at 423, held that the
temporal proximity of the victim’s complaint to the
sexual offense does not affect the admissibility of the
complaint, but only its probative worth.
In determining whether duplicative fresh complaint
testimony is admissible, the court must balance the
probative value of such testimony, bearing in mind the
purpose of the rule, against the potential for prejudice.
State v. Hill, 121 N.J. at 169-70.Convictions can still be sustained even though the
trial court fails to give a limiting instruction as to the fresh
complaint evidence unless the error can be shown to be
clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v.