The origin of the state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule elucidates the nature of that exception and
the scope of its availability. The exception has received its
earliest and perhaps most extensive discussion in Hunter
v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495 (E. & A. 1878). In Hunter, a
murder victim made statements which indicated that he
was planning to go to Camden that evening with the
defendant. The admission of those statements was
upheld on appeal on the grounds that the victim’s
declarations were part of the res gestae and were
sufficiently reliable because they either explained the
victim’s subsequent conduct or they reflected his state of
mind at the time they were made, that state of mind
being directly in issue. Id. at 536-42; accord, Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1802); State v.
Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 389-394 (1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 816 (1963). Hunter demonstrates that the state
of mind exception, arising as it does from the common
law doctrine of res gestae, is highly limited in scope. See
State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 394-96, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 980 (1966); Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1
N.J. 304, 322 (1949).
In State v. Gibson, 156 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 78 N.J. 411 (1978), the defendant was
charged with possession of drugs with intent to
distribute. The crucial transaction occurred in a co-
defendant’s apartment. The defendant sought to prove
that he made statements indicating he was going to that
apartment to discuss insurance policies. This evidence
was excluded. The Appellate Division held that this was
error, although harmless in nature, because the statement
did arguably fall within the ambit of former Evid. R.
63(12). However, the court noted that the statement
might have been properly excluded if the trial court
found that it was not “made in good faith.” State v.
Gibson, 156 N.J. Super. 525-26; Cf. In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 21-22 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1977)
(Statements regarding possible termination of extraordi-
nary life sustaining treatment were too remote and
impersonal to have probative value).
However, See also Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361
(1985), where the court held that evidence of the
decision which an incompetent person would have made
with respect to life sustaining treatment is not
impermissible hearsay since oral and written expressions
of a person’s reactions or desires fit within the existing
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.
The rule often is applied in criminal cases with
respect to statements of homicide victims. Generally, a
decedent’s hearsay statements are not admissible to prove
a defendant’s motivation or conduct. State v. Benedetto,
120 N.J. at 255-61; State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 112-
13 (1991); State v. Machado, 111 N.J. 480, 489 (1988);
State v. Prudden, 212 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 1986);
State v. Downey, 206 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 1986).
Thus, generalized statements of a victim’s fear of the
defendant are inadmissible. State v. Benedetto, supra; State
v. Machado, supra.In Machado, the Supreme Court ruled that oral
statements made by a homicide victim to others that the
defendant was jealous, possessive, and violent towards
her, as well as a letter written by the victim to the
defendant in which she stated that she left him because
she felt her life was in danger, were improperly admitted
at the defendant’s murder trial. The court held that the
victim’s state of mind with regard to the danger she felt
from the defendant was inadmissible for the purpose of
inferring the state of mind of the defendant from those
declarations. The court distinguished its holding from
that of State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379 (1966), on the basis
that the statements in Baldwin were by the defendant
and admissible to establish the defendant’s state of mind.
The Machado Court pointed out, however, that some of
the victim’s statements could be admissible as
background to establish the nature of the relationship
between the victim and the defendant. The Court
further noted that where the hearsay declarations by the
victim did not express fear of the defendant, they might
be admissible as a declaration of the victim’s state of mind
or under some other hearsay exception, such as that
pertaining to contemporaneous declarations.The key to admissibility, therefore, is that the
declarant/victim’s state of mind must have some
relevance to the issues at trial. This may include the
admission of state of mind hearsay to establish the nature
of the relationship between the victim and the defendant,
i.e., the “mosaic” of the event. See also State v. Benedetto,
supra; State v. Machado, supra; State v. Vasquez, 265 N.J.
Super. 346, 360 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 480
(1993), but see, State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92 (App.
Div. 1988) (hearsay statements of a murder victim to her
mother, sister, and a friend regarding her relationship
with the defendant, her husband, were inadmissible
under former Evid. R. 63(12), the statements were
considered to be probative of nothing but the marital
breakdown between the victim and the defendant).
More specifically, the court in Downey, 206 N.J. Super. at
392-93, posited three exceptions to the rule prohibiting
statements of fear of the victim: (1) where the defendant
asserts a claim of self-defense as justification for the
killing, (2) where the defendant seeks to defend upon a