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Super. at 417; State v. H.G.G., 202 N.J. Super. at 270;
State v. Merendino, 293 N.J. Super. at 451.


An objection under this subsection, even though it
may only be procedural in nature, can not be ignored by
the Court. In instances where Courts have attempted to
grant relief, notwithstanding a statutory objection or
prohibition under this subsection, the Appellate Courts
have not hesitated to reverse. It is not within the
discretion of the court to ignore a statutory objection to
an expungement. State v. A.N.J., III, 98 N.J. at 427
(1985); In re F.A.U., 190 N.J. Super. at 247-248; State
v. H.G.G., 202 N.J. Super. at 271-272; see also, State v.
San Vito, 133 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 1975); State v.
DeMarco, 174 N.J. Super. at 417.


In addition to these general objections, other and
more specific objections can be interposed under § 14a,
depending on the specific relief being sought.



  1. Criminal convictions


Under the explicit terms of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2a, a
petitioner can expunge only one criminal conviction.
The purpose of the expungement statutory scheme is to
“be construed with the primary objective of providing
relief to the one-time offender.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32.
IMO Application of R., 171 N.J. Super. 53, 57 (App. Div.
1979); State v. D’Angerio, 124 N.J. Super. 240, 243 (Law
Div. 1973); see also, State v. A.N.J., III, 98 N.J. at 427;
State v. Blazanin, 298 N.J. Super. 221, 225-6 (App. Div.
1997). The existence of another criminal conviction in
this State, or in any other jurisdiction (federal or other
State), is an absolute bar to expungement relief. IMO,
N.A., 218 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 1987); IMO
Application of Hart, 265 N.J. Super. 285 (Law Div.
1993); State v. Josselyn, III, 148 N.J. Super. 538, 540-541
(Law Div. 1977).


If the petitioner is seeking to expunge a criminal
conviction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, and that
conviction is for one of the enumerated offenses at
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b ¶ 1 or ¶ 2, then the expungement
must be denied. The crimes listed at ¶ 1 were crimes
under Title 2 or Title 2A, the predecessor statutes to the
Code of Criminal Justice. Those offenses are not listed by
their statutory reference; rather, they are listed by the
name of the offense. Crimes under the Code of Criminal
Justice are listed by their statutory reference and name.
For the crimes listed under ¶ 1 and ¶ 2 there is a
prohibition on convictions for conspiracies or attempts to
commit those crimes.


Criminal convictions, by indictment or accusation,
can be expunged pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A.
2C:52-2. However, only one criminal conviction can be
expunged. Persons with more that one criminal
conviction are absolutely barred from any relief under
this statute. See, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32; IMO, N.A., 218
N.J. Super. at 547. But see, State v. Blinsinger, 114 N.J.
Super. 318 (App. Div. 1971), distinguished by State v.
Dylag, 267 N.J. Super. 348 (Law Div. 1993) (the
Blinsinger Court determined that a Disorderly Persons
conviction was not a criminal conviction for the purposes
of barring an expungement of a subsequent criminal
conviction). The limitation on expungement for the one-
time offender, has been strictly applied. A petitioner
with multiple convictions can not serially expunge all of
his convictions, by applying for expungement relief for
one offense at a time. IMO Application of R., 171 N.J.
Super. 53 (App. Div. 1979).

There is, however, an exception for certain multiple
offenders under the holding in In Re Fontana, 146 N.J.
Super. 264 (App. Div. 1976), cited with approval in State
v. A.N.J., III, 98 N.J. at 427, n. 3. A person convicted of
a crime spree can seek to expunge all charges evolving
from that spree. See, IMO, Application of V.S., 258 N.J.
Super. 348, 352 (Law Div. 1992). The Court defined a
crime spree as one with related factual and time elements.
In Re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. at 267. The burden is on
the petitioner to establish the necessary proofs that the
convictions constituted a spree.

That statutory bar, limiting relief to the one-time
offender, applies for criminal convictions in New Jersey,
as well as other jurisdictions, including federal
convictions. IMO, N.A., supra; IMO Application of Hart,
supra; State v. Josselyn, III, supra.

There is a statutory 10 year waiting period, which
does not begin to run until the petitioner has been fully
and completely discharged from the criminal justice
system, including discharge from parole or probation,
and the payment of all fines and penalties. If a person
made a payment plan for their fines and penalties, the 10
year waiting period will not begin until the payment plan
is completed. State v. Rapacchia, 124 N.J. Super. 331
(Law Div. 1973).

This statute also contains specific exclusions, or
statutory bars to expungement relief, for persons
convicted of certain enumerated crimes and offenses. See,
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b; State v. Raymond M., 188 N.J. Super.
533 (Law Div. 1982); In Re Application, R.C., 292 N.J.
Super. 151 (Law Div. 1996); IMO Application of R., 171
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