This section also underscores the holding in IMO
Application of R., 171 N.J. Super. 53 (App. Div. 1979)
which prohibited a serialization of the expungement
process. “[T]he statute provides that a single conviction
can be expunged.... But, such expungement cannot be
used to erase his record of the previous convictions. The
intent of the Legislature was not to permit a multiple
offender to expunge the records of all his convictions by
starting with the last and working backwards, arguing
each time that his latter convictions never occurred
because they are expunged.” 171 N.J. Super. at 57; State
v. N.W., 329 N.J. Super. 326, 334, n. 9 (App. Div.
2000).
In order to interpose this objection, a prosecutor is
permitted to access the expunged records, including the
Order to Expunge, and present those materials to the
Court as the evidence in support of the objection. This
access and use of expunged records is specifically
authorized under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-17
and -24. Also, as with an objection under N.J.S.A.
2C:52-2, based upon a prior or subsequent criminal
conviction, proof of the prior or subsequent criminal
conviction is deemed sufficient upon presentation of a
certified Judgment of Conviction. State v. H.G.G., 202
N.J. Super. at 273.
- Participation in a PTI or other supervisory
treatment program, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14f
Whenever a petitioner is applying to expunge a
criminal conviction or convictions of disorderly or petty
disorderly persons offenses, and that petitioner has had a
criminal charge dismissed following participation in a
PTI or other supervisory treatment or other diversion
program (e.g., conditional discharge, N.J.S.A. 24:21-
27), expungement can not be granted. IMO Petition,
Anthony Podias, 284 N.J. Super. 674 (App. Div. 1995);
State v. Dylag, 267 N.J. Super. 348 (Law Div. 1993); State
v. B.C., 235 N.J. Super. 157 (Law Div. 1989).
EXTRADITIONEXTRADITIONEXTRADITIONEXTRADITIONEXTRADITION
I. NATURE & SOURCE OF PROCEEDINGS
(See also, INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON
DETAINERS, this Digest)
As explained in In re Cohen, 23 N.J. Super. 209, 214-
218 (App. Div. 1951), aff’d 12 N.J. 362 (1953), the
return of fugitives from one state to another is a federal,
not a state matter governed by the United States
Constitution, Article IV, § 2, clause 2 and 18 U.S.C. §
31852-3195; see also State v. Morel, 253 N.J. Super. 470
(App. Div. 1992). The federal provisions have been
implemented by N.J.S.A. 2A:160-1 et seq. (The Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act); Cf. Watts v. McGowan, 516
F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975) (international extradition is
governed only by considerations of comity and treaty
provisions).In both Cohen and State v. Phillips, 62 N.J. Super. 70,
74-75 (App. Div. 1960), aff’d 34 N.J. 63 (1961), the
Appellate Division set forth the rule in New Jersey
respecting the scope of inquiry at an extradition
proceeding. Such a hearing is limited to a consideration
of the identity of the accused as the person named in the
requisition and rendition warrant, and whether the
accused is a fugitive from justice. This last inquiry
requires a determination that a crime is alleged and that
the accused was within the demanding state at the time
of its commission. Id; Cf. In re Mahler, 177 N.J. Super.
337 (App. Div. 1981) (surrender of a nonfugitive, unlike
surrender of a fugitive, is within discretion of the
Governor, but discretionary nature of the gubernatorial
function does not mandate a hearing as a prerequisite to
a valid exercise of discretion), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 349,
350 (1981).It is well established that the rendition papers
constitute prima facie evidence that the named accused
stands charged with the alleged crime and is a fugitive
from justice. It is open to the accused to show that he is
not the person charged or that he was not present within
the demanding state when any of the essential acts of
setting the crime in motion transpired. Absent such a
showing, the demanding authority’s warrant is
presumptive evidence of his presence and the accused
must bear the burden or proving the contrary by clear and
convincing proof. State v. Phillips, supra; Passalaqua v.
Biehler, 46 N.J. Super. 63, 73 (App. Div. 1957); Foley v.
State, 32 N.J. Super. 154, 159-60 (App. Div. 1954).
Moreover, waivers of extradition rights, executed as a
condition of either parole or probation, are enforceable by