requiring performers to use sound system and sound
technician provided by city, did not violate free speech
rights of performers.
In City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), the
operator of an establishment featuring nude erotic
dancing challenged constitutionality of city’s public
indecency ordinance proscribing nudity in public places.
The Supreme Court held that: (1) ordinance was
content-neutral regulation; and (2) ordinance satisfied
O’Brien standard for restrictions on symbolic speech.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S.
41 (1986), a suit was brought challenging the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which prohibited
adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000
feet of any residential zone, single or multiple-family
dwelling, church, park or school. Held: The ordinance,
which was predominantly concerned with the secondary
effects of adult theaters and not on the content of adult
films, was “content-neutral” speech regulation that
served a substantial government interest while leaving
reasonable alternatives. It was a valid governmental
response to the serious problems created by adult theaters
and did not violate the First Amendment.
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215
(1990), petitioners involved with adult entertainment
industry adversely affected by zoning and licensing
ordinance, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) petitioners could challenge
facial validity of ordinance on First Amendment prior
restraint grounds; (2) ordinance’s failure to provide
reasonable period during which decision whether to issue
license must be made, and to provide avenue for prompt
judicial review of adverse decision, rendered licensing
requirements unconstitutional as enforced against
petitioners engaged in First Amendment activity; and (3)
petitioners lacked standing to challenge ordinance
provisions barring persons residing with individuals
whose licenses to conduct sexually oriented businesses
had been denied or revoked, or prohibiting applicants for
such licenses.
State of New Jersey, Township of Pennsauken v. Schad,
160 N.J. 156 (1997). Defendant who operated two
adult entertainment businesses was convicted of violating
the town sign ordinance. The Appellate Division
reversed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that (1)
sign ordinance applied to illuminated displays installed
behind front windows of defendant’s adult entertain-
ment business; (2) sign ordinance did not violate the free
speech guarantee; (3) the permit requirement in the sign
ordinance was not an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech; (4) the sign ordinance was not void for vagueness;
(5) the sign ordinance was not selectively enforced in
violation of equal protection; and (6) fines totalling
$95,920 were not cruel and unusual punishment. In
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that a
restriction on commercial speech which concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading does not violate the First
Amendment if the asserted governmental interest is
substantial, the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest, and the regulation is no more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at
176, quoting Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v.
New York Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).Allen v. City of Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557 (Law
Div. 1987). Bordentown enacted an ordinance which
prohibited minors under 18 years-of-age from being in
public places between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Certain
exceptions to such prohibition were provided for. The
ordinance further provided for any law enforcement
officer “in the exercise of reasonable judgment” to
determine if the ordinance had been violated. The trial
court ruled such ordinance unconstitutional as violative
of an individual’s First Amendment right to travel. Such
constitutionality was premised upon the statute’s lack of
ascertainable standards and overbreadth.Bell v. Stafford Township, 110 N.J. 384 (1988).
Stafford Township enacted an ordinance prohibiting
billboards, signboards, and off-premises advertising signs
within any zoning district of the township. Plaintiff,
owner of an outdoor advertising company, was denied
pursuant to the ordinance, a permit to erect a billboard.
The Court held that the ordinance was facially
unconstitutional. Finding that the ordinance infringed
on the fundamental right of free speech, the Court
determined that the township failed to present evidence
to demonstrate that the ordinance furthers a substantial
government interest, and is sufficiently narrow to further
only that interest without unnecessarily restricting
freedom of expression.State of New Jersey, Borough of Paramus v. Malcolm
Konner Chevrolet, 226 N.J. Super. 692 (Law Div. 1988).
Defendants were found guilty of violating a borough
ordinance prohibiting the flying of garrison flags, except
on holidays or as permitted by Presidential proclamation.
The Court used the three-prong test established by the
United States Supreme Court in Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. 641 (1984), and in State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402
(1980). The Court found that the ordinance met the