IV. GRADING
Forgery is a crime of the third degree if the writing is
or purports to be part of an issue of money, securities,
postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments,
certificates or licenses issued by the government, New
Jersey Prescription Blanks as referred to in N.J.S.A.
45:14-14, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other
instruments representing interest in or claims against any
property or enterprise, or an access device. N.J.S.A.
2C:21-1b. Otherwise, forgery is a crime of the fourth
degree. Id.
Forgery of a withdrawal slip is fourth degree forgery
because it does not constitute a writing which purports
to be “part of an issue of money, securities, postage, or
revenue stamps or other instruments,” within the
meaning of the language defining third-degree forgery.
State v. Reed, 183 N.J. Super. 184, 191-92 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 91 N.J. 228 (1982). Likewise, forgery of a
check or other like instrument is also a crime of the fourth
degree. State v. Ott, 181 N.J. Super. 559, 561-62 (Law
Div. 1981).
Possession of forgery devices is a crime of the third
degree. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1c.
V. CULPABILITY
The culpability requirement for forgery is satisfied by
proof that the defendant acted with a purpose to defraud
or injure another either by injuring that person’s
reputation or integrity, or by causing pecuniary gain or
loss. The requirement is also satisfied by proof that the
defendant knowingly facilitated a fraud or injury to be
perpetrated by another person. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1a.
The intent to defraud, injure, or damage another
person is an essential element which must be alleged and
proven in a forgery prosecution. State v. Weigel, 194 N.J.
Super. 451 (App. Div. 1984); State v. Bulna, 46 N.J.
Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1957). However, the very act
of forgery itself may be sufficient to imply an intent to
defraud. State v. Bulna, supra, 46 N.J. Super. at 318. In
Bulna, supra, for example, the court found the
defendant’s forgery of a motor vehicle ownership
certificate and consequent registration of the car in that
name gave rise to the natural inference that he intended
to convert the car. Id. at 318-19.
It is not necessary to prove that the person intended
to be defrauded was actually defrauded. The act of
forgery itself implies the intent to defraud, even if the
person who receives the instrument does not realize it is
a forgery. State v. Gledhill, 67 N.J. 565, 572 (1975); State
v. Weigel, supra, 194 N.J. Super. at 458.If the forger has the requisite intent, and the writing
could have been relied on as legally significant, the crime
of forgery is complete. State v. Schultz, 71 N.J. 590, 599-
600 (1975); State v. Weigel, supra, 194 N.J. Super. at 458.
Knowledge or purposeful intent may be inferred
from the fact that the defendant is attempting to cash a
forged instrument, due to his possession of the
instrument and his uttering that it is genuine. State v.
Sabo, 86 N.J. Super. 508, 513 (App. Div. 1965).The “person” defrauded within the meaning of the
forgery statutes may be “any one” in general. State v.
Thrunk, supra, 157 N.J. Super. at 274. It could also be
a governmental unit. State v. Johnson, 115 N.J. Super. 6,
9 (App. Div. 1971).VI. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT
The first type of conduct which constitutes forgery
under the Code is the altering or changing any writing of
another without his authorization. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-
1a(1). The Code does not require the State to prove that
the alteration of an instrument be material. The prior
statute relating to forgery also had no such requirement.
See N.J.S.A. 2A:109-1 (repeated 1979).Rather, the requirement that the alteration be
material was read into the statute by the Appellate
Division in State v. Thrunk, supra, 157 N.J. Super. at 272
(holding that for an alteration of an instrument to
constitute forgery, it must be “material”). Under
Thrunk, a material alteration is one that makes the
instrument “speak a language different in legal effect from
that which it originally spoke or which carries with it
some change in the rights, interests, or obligations of the
parties to the writing. Id. The materiality of the
alteration charged has been held to be a question of law
for the court. Id. at 273; but see, State v. Anderson, 127
N.J. 191 (1992), (holding that materiality in a perjury
prosecution must be found by the jury).It is questionable whether the same approach can
applied under the present law as it pertains to the forgery
of private documents or records. While the alteration
may have no legal effect, it still may have the capacity to
injure. It has been suggested that the culpability
requirement of a purpose to defraud or injure or of a
knowledge of facilitating a fraud is a sufficient measure of