Drug Reform Act did not violate defendant’s equal
protection rights under State Constitution since
provision was rationally related to legitimate governmen-
tal interest of battling crime by punishing recidivists
more severely; repeat offenders are more dangerous than
first-time convicts and more deserving of punishment.
Mandatory Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction
penalties did not violate drug defendant’s equal
protection rights under State Constitution; use of
collected penalties to finance drug rehabilitation
programs and law enforcement activities was reasonable.
See also State v. Bulu, 234 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div.
1989).
According to State in Interest of L.M., 229 N.J. Super.
88 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 485 (1989),
in determining whether federal equal protection clause is
violated, New Jersey courts apply traditional rational
basis test, where Legislature has created nonsuspect
classifications of offenders for purposes of fixing penalties.
Legislature’s decision to deal harshly with drug law
offenders as class is not constitutionally defective as
violative of federal equal protection. Treatment accorded
to both juveniles and adults as drug offenders under
statute providing for mandatory imposition of fines as
part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act does not
amount to suspect classification, for purposes of claim
state and federal equal protection rights are violated.
In State v. Ogar, 229 N.J. Super. 459 (App. Div.
1989), provision prohibiting distribution and possession
of drugs within 1,000 feet of school property or school
bus was not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and did
not violate due process or equal protection as applied. See
also; State v. Brown, 227 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div.
1988); State v. Rodriguez, 225 N.J. Super. 466 (Law
Div.1988); State v. Morales, 224 N.J. Super. 72 (Law Div.
1987).
State v. Rodriguez, 225 N.J. Super. 466 (Law Div.
1988). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, which provides for a
minimum three year period of parole ineligibility for
people convicted of possessing controlled dangerous
substances within 1,000 feet of a school with intent to
distribute, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection clause since it was rationally related to
the State’s legitimate interest in protecting school age
children and the statute did not have a racially
discriminatory intent or purpose.
State v. McMinn, 197 N.J. Super. 621 (App. Div.
1984), held the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II
narcotic under N.J.S.A. 24:21-1 et seq. does not deny
defendant equal protection or due process. The court also
held that the term “pure free base drug” was not
unconstitutionally vague, since it was commonly
understood to mean undiluted or unadulterated. Also,
the distinctions in N.J.S.A. 24:21-19b(2), for sentencing
purposes, between more than an ounce of cocaine and less
than an ounce, and between 3.5 grams of pure free base
drug and less than 3.5 grams, were proper legislative
classifications reasonably related to the government’s
objective to impose greater punishment for more serious
degrees of harm.In New Jersey Ass’n of Ticket Brokers v. Ticketron, 226
N.J. Super. 155 (App. Div. 1988), since plaintiffs,
challenging the anti-ticket scalping statute on equal
protection grounds, failed to demonstrate any
classification, invidious or otherwise, as support for its
challenge, the statute did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.State v. Morales, 224 N.J. Super. 72 (Law Div. 1987).
Where all defendants are treated similarly and all are
given the same choices, statutes which provide for
different penalties depending on whether defendants
plead guilty or are found guilty at a jury trial do not
violate the equal protection clause. Accord, State v. Brown,
227 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988).In Allen v. Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557 (Law
Div. 1987), a local curfew ordinance which prohibited
minors from being in public places between the hours of
9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. except in certain severely
limited circumstances was a violation of minors’ right to
the equal protection of the law. The court applied the
“compelling interest” test in reaching this determina-
tion, as the fundamental rights of freedom of speech,
assembly and religion were involved. The test requires
that state restrictions which inhibit fundamental rights
of minors “are valid only if they serve any significant state
interest that is not present in the case of an adult.” The
court found that here, the ordinance prohibited activities
which the government had a compelling interest to
encourage; the ordinance therefore denied minors and
their parents equal protection.State v. Bianco, 103 N.J. 383 (1986), held the
excessive sentence oral argument program instituted by
the Appellate Division, which in effect created a subclass
of indigent defendants, did not deny defendants equal
protection. The classification was rationally related to
the state’s legitimate interest in alleviating delays in the
appellate process and securing prompt justice for all.