pecuniary benefit obtained or sought to be obtained in
addition to any other penalties imposed. Id.
Except as provided in subsection c herein, each act of
health care claims fraud constitutes an additional,
separate and distinct offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3e.
C. Inferences
The falsity, fictitiousness, fraudulence or misleading
nature of a statement may be inferred by the trier of fact
when a practitioner who attempts to submit, submits,
causes or attempts to cause to be submitted any record,
bill, claim or other document for treatment or procedure
without the practitioner, or his or her associate, having
performed an assessment of the physical or mental
condition of the patient or client necessary to determine
the appropriate course of treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-
4.3f(1).
The falsity, fictitiousness, fraudulence or misleading
nature of a statement may be inferred by the trier of fact
where a person who attempts to submit, submits, causes
or attempts to cause to be submitted any record, bill,
claim or other document for more treatments or
procedures were represented to have been performed.
N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3f(2).
Proof that a practitioner signed or initialed a record,
bill, claim or other document gives rise to an inference
that the practitioner read and reviewed that record, bill
or other document. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3f(3).
D. Culpability
Under this section, a person acts recklessly with
respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3h. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation. Id.
None of these offenses preclude an indictment or
conviction for any other offense defined by the laws of this
State. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3i(1).
None of these offenses preclude an assignment judge
from dismissing a prosecution of health care claims fraud
if the assignment judge determines the conduct charged
to be a de minimis infraction. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3i(2).IX. BAD CHECKS
It is an offense under this section to issue or pass a
check or similar sight order for payment of money,
knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee.
N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5. Property need not be obtained for a
conviction under this section. However, if property is
obtained, there can be a conviction under the theft
statute. See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4.A. Presumptions and CulpabilityThe Code made significant changes from the prior
statute relating to bad checks, especially with regard to
the culpability requirement. Instead of having to prove
an intent to defraud, N.J.S.A. 2A:111-15 (repealed
1979), the State now need only prove knowledge that the
check would not be paid. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5a and b.The State has the benefit of two presumptions in
proving the requisite knowledge. An issuer is presumed
to know that the bad check or money order (other than
a post-dated check or order) would not be paid if:a. the issuer had no account with the drawee at the
time the check or order was issued; orb. payment was refused by the drawee for lack of
funds, upon presentation within 30 days after issue, and
the issuer failed to make good within 10 days after
receiving notice of that refusal or after notice was sent to
the issuer’s last known address. Id. Notice of refusal may
be given to the issuer orally or in writing in any reasonable
manner by any person. Id.Whenever a presumption would operate in a
prosecution for bad checks, it would also apply in a
prosecution for theft committed by means of a bad check.
N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5.These presumptions do not apply to post-dated
checks or money orders. Id. Although post-dated checks
are covered by the statute, the State must prove that the
drawer knew at the time the post-dated check was drawn
that it would not be honored. State v. Kelm, 289 N.J.
Super. 55, 59 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 68
(1996).