group. State v. Ramseur, 197 N.J. Super. 565, 576 (Law
Div.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 106 N.J. 123 (1987).
Once defendant has established a prima facie case
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the State must rebut
the case and dispel the inference of intentional
discrimination by showing that permissible racially
neutral selection criteria and procedures produced the
disproportionate result. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
at 497-98; State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 216-17. To
rebut a defendant’s prima facie case under fair cross-
section principles, the State must show that a significant
state interest is advanced by those aspects of the jury
selection process that result in underrepresentation of the
cognizable group. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 367-
68; State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 217.
Under both a Sixth and a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge, defendant need not show that the jury that
actually returned the indictment was underrepresented
by a particular group. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 216.
On the other hand, a particular grand jury does not have
to mirror the community. Instead, the process must be
random to ensure that each person has an equal
opportunity to serve. Id. at 231; State v. Long, 204 N.J.
Super. 469, 483-84 (Law Div. 1985); State v. Porro, 152
N.J. Super. 259, 267 (Law Div. 1977). Therefore, trial
courts should not attempt to obtain racial balance by
disqualifying prospective grand jurors on the basis of race.
State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 228-36.
In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1986),
the Supreme Court explained that intentional racial
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors is a grave
constitutional trespass, possible only under color of state
authority, and wholly within the State’s power to
prevent. A conviction does not cure the taint attributable
to a grand jury selected on the basis of race, and the
harmless error R. therefore will not apply.
The United States Supreme Court has determined
that a white defendant has the requisite third-party
standing to challenge the selection of grand jurors based
on a claim of discrimination against black people.
Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397-400 (1998).
In challenging the grand jury selection process under
the statutory requirement that such a selection be
random (N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4), the party attacking the
process must show by a preponderance of the believable
evidence that the process is fatally flawed. State v. Long,
204 N.J. Super. at 485.
In State v. Russo, 213 N.J. Super. 219, 226-28 (Law
Div. 1986), it was held that the county selection
procedure was defective because it omitted from a driver’s
license list licensed drivers residing in certain zip codes;
those zip codes contained names of non-county residents
as well as county residents. Also, the procedure used to
merge the voter and driver’s lists was deficient because it
only eliminated exact duplicate names and failed to
eliminate other obvious duplicate names.In State v. Chappee, 211 N.J. Super. 321, 332-33
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 45 (1987), the court
held that defendant’s rights to equal protection and to an
impartial grand jury were not violated despite the
underrepresentation of women as grand jury forepersons
in grand juries which had equal amounts of men and
women where there was clearly no intentional
discrimination and where duties of foreperson were
ministerial.To serve as a grand juror one must 1) be eighteen
years or older, 2) be able to read and understand English,
3) be a United States citizen, 4) be a resident of the
county in which he or she is summoned, 5) not have been
convicted of any indictable offense, and 6) not have any
mental or physical disability which prevents the person
from properly serving as a juror. N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1. A lack
of any one qualification for service constitutes good cause
to challenge a particular juror, and defendant need not
show that a juror’s failure to respond truthfully to a
question that would have disqualified her for cause if
answered truthfully was deliberate or prejudicial. State v.
Williams, 190 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 1983).Regarding challenges to individual jurors based on
bias or interest, once a grand juror reveals a basis for
questioning his or her ability to proceed due to bias or
interest, the prosecutor must make a threshold finding to
ascertain whether the situation warrants excusal. If the
circumstances appear sufficient to raise a reasonable
inference of bias or interest, the prosecutor must refer the
matter to the assignment judge. R. 3:6-3(a); State v.
Murphy, 110 N.J. 20 (1988). In State v. Brown, 289 N.J.
Super. 285 (App. Div. 1996), the indictment was
properly dismissed when the prosecutor failed to notify
the assignment judge that two grand jurors were possibly
biased since they knew the police officers involved in the
case. In State v. Schenkowlewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 (1997), the court
held that, so long as the juror had the capacity to have
tainted the other jurors, the indictment was properly
dismissed based on the prosecutor’s failure to advise the